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INTRODUCTION
Designer Carter Bryant was under a contract with Mattel, Inc.,
manufacturer and owner of the Barbie doll, when he produced
some drawings and came up with the characteristics of what
became the Bratz doll.1
Bryant then moved to MGA
Entertainment, Inc., producer of Bratz, which, since her market
debut in 2001,2 posed serious competition to the Barbie doll.3
Lawsuits followed. In 2008, a federal jury in California found in
favor of Mattel and ordered a total of $100 million for several

1

Mattel, Inc. v. Bryant, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1086 (C.D. Cal. 2005); see also Jury
Rules for Mattel in Bratz Doll Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2008, at C5; David Colker,
Mattel Gets Control of Bratz Dolls, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2008, at C1.
2
Colker, supra note 1.
3
Jury Rules for Mattel, supra note 1.
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causes, one of which was copyright infringement.4 The court then
issued an injunction against MGA.5 Bryant himself settled with
Mattel.6
David Miller was employed as the supervisor of the quality
control laboratory at CP Chemicals, Inc.7 His tasks included
computerization of analytical data generated in the lab.8 At his
home, Miller wrote a computer program that assisted him in his
calculations, with the knowledge of his employer.9 In 1993, a
district court in South Carolina ruled that the copyright in the
program belonged to his employer.10
Who should own Bratz? Who should own the software Miller
composed? Should the law treat different kinds of works in the
same manner? Put more generally, who should be the copyright
owner of creative works made by employees? Should we treat the
Bryants and the Millers alike? This article argues that current legal
doctrine requires a more solid basis for dealing with the issue of
ownership of employees’ creative works. This article suggests that
we address the allocation of copyright in the workplace by
conceptualizing the issue under a dual, integrated perspective of
both copyright law and employment law.11 Surprisingly, such
4
Phase B Verdict Form as Given at 4, Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., No. 04-9049
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2008), available at http://www.lawupdates.com/pdf/resources/
copyright/Jury_Verdict-08-26-2008-Bryant_v._Mattel,_Inc..pdf. Other causes of action
were intentional interference with contractual relations; aiding and abetting breach of
fiduciary duty; and aiding and abetting breach of the duty of loyalty. Phase B Verdict
Form as Given at 2, Mattel, No. 04-9049. One commentator argued, “copyright
infringement is an indirect and inefficient way to stop a direct competitor from using
trade secrets misappropriated by a former employee of a competitor.” See Jane Osborne
McKnight, Disloyal Employees and Trade Secrets: What We Can Learn from Barbies
and Bratz, 34 VT. B.J. 38, 42 (Fall 2008).
5
Order Granting Mattel, Inc.’s Motion for Permanent Injunction, Bryant v. Mattel,
Inc., No. 04-9049 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2008), available at http://www.lawupdates.com/
pdf/postings/copyright/Order-Bryant_v._Mattel.pdf.
6
Colker, supra note 1.
7
Miller v. CP Chems., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1238, 1239 (D.S.C. 1992).
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 1244.
11
Dan Burk addressed the allocation rule from a corporate law point of view, arguing
that different kinds of intellectual property play a role in demarcating the boundaries of
property within the firm. See generally Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property and the Firm,
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (2004) [hereinafter Burk, Intellectual Property]. His application of
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integration is absent from current American legal discourse. The
discussion here focuses on economic/material rights and leaves
moral rights for a separate discussion.
Copyright law in the Anglo-American system addresses this
allocation via the work-made-for-hire doctrine.12 The doctrine
provides quite a bright line: works made by employees within the
scope of their employment belong to the employer; commissioned
works in specific enumerated categories are also considered works
made for hire and belong to the commissioning party.13 All other
works belong to the author.14 In either case, initial ownership can
be transferred to another party.15 The current work-made-for-hire
is based on a rather narrow, textual interpretation of the law. In
interpreting the legal concepts of employee (the “employment
element”) and the scope of employment (the “scope element”),

this theory to ownership of copyrighted works suggests that authorship and ownership be
bifurcated so to protect the reputational interests of the employees. See id. at 11–15; see
also Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing
Intellectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 575, 635
[hereinafter Burk & McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis] (pointing to the option of
assigning initial ownership to employees).
12
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining a “work made for hire” as “(1) a work
prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work
specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part
of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work,
as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an
atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work
shall be considered a work made for hire. For the purpose of the foregoing sentence, a
‘supplementary work’ is a work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work
by another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining,
revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords,
afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical
arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes, and an
‘instructional text’ is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and
with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities . . . .”); id. § 201(b) (“In the
case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was
prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have
expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights
comprised in the copyright.”); see also discussion infra Part I.C.
13
17 U.S.C. § 101.
14
Id.
15
See id. § 201(d).
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courts turned to agency law.16 Employment law is strikingly
absent from this discourse as well as the economic understanding
of copyright law.17
Changing modes of production and changing modes of
employment18 call for a re-examination of the work-made-for-hire
doctrine and a better understanding of its theoretical
underpinnings.
The meeting point of copyright law and
employment law reflects a deeper underlying conflict, between
efficiency and fairness. Each body of law struggles with
reconciling the two principles, and the intersection of the two
fields enhances the conflict.
Part I draws an allocation spectrum and maps current legal
models on it, ranging from full allocation to the
employer/commissioning party on the one hand if some criteria are
met,
to
unwaiveable
rights
allocated
to
the
employee/commissioned party on the other hand. American law
provides an example of the former and German law provides an
example of the latter. In between there are several other options
that will be addressed. Part I also draws lessons from the Supreme
Court’s 2001 decision in New York Times Co. v. Tasini19 and its
16
See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid (CCNV), 490 U.S. 730, 741 (1989). A
district court dared to comment on the matter, after CCNV was decided, stating that its
principles “are difficult to utilize in determining the issue of copyright ownership.” Avtec
Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, No. 92-463-A, 1994 WL 791188, at *4 n.6 (E.D. Va. Sept. 12,
1994). Agency law developed in the context of tort law, which does not necessarily fit
the copyright context. See id. For criticism on the importation of agency law into
copyright law, see generally Assaf Jacob, Tort Made for Hire—Reconsidering the CCNV
Case, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 96 (2008). Burk and McDonnell argue that agency law
generally resembles intellectual property law in the way each field divides rights to
copyrighted works made within the firm. See Burk & McDonnell, The Goldilocks
Hypothesis, supra note 11, at 597 (suggesting that this resemblance is either the result of
both legal fields tracking the most efficient legal rule, or that intellectual property law
simply drew upon agency law).
17
Also absent are antitrust considerations, which otherwise might have been relevant
in some cases. For example, the result of the Barbie-Bratz legal dispute is strengthening
the power of one dominant player.
18
See infra Part I.A.
19
533 U.S. 483 (2001); see also discussion infra Part I.D. See generally Robertson v.
Thomson Corp., [2006] 2 S.C.R. 363 (Can.); Douglas P. Bickham, Extra! Can’t Read All
About It: Articles Disappear After High Court Rules Freelance Writers Taken Out of
Context in New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 29 W. ST. U. L. REV. 85 (2001) (discussing
Tasini’s aftermath); Amy Terry, Tasini Aftermath: The Consequences of the Freelancers’
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aftermath. The Court ruled that the republication of freelance
journalists’ works in digital media infringed their rights,20 a
decision which resulted in a sweeping change in contracts between
commissioning parties and independent authors. Surprisingly, the
case received relatively little scholarly attention, with a few
notable exceptions.21
This article then proceeds to examine copyright law and
employment law, with the aim of deducing lessons as to the best
possible initial allocation. There are several conceptions of each of
these fields, and thus any attempt to integrate them necessarily has
to choose which of these conceptions to juxtapose.
As for copyright law, Part II proceeds within the instrumental,
incentive-based theory of copyright law, based on by-now familiar
economic analysis.22 Previous economic analysis addressed the
allocation of ownership within the workplace only in passing, or
focused on ex post allocations, i.e., after the copyrighted work had

Victory, 14 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 231 (2004); Andrew Snyder,
Comment, Pulling the Plug: Ignoring the Rights of the Public in Interpreting Copyright
Law, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 365 (2002).
20
Tasini, 533 U.S. at 520.
21
See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fine-Tuning Tasini: Privileges of Electronic
Distribution and Reproduction, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 473 (2000); Robert A. Gorman &
Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors and Publishers: Adversaries or Collaborators in Copyright
Law?, in BENJAMIN KAPLAN ET AL., AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT, REPUBLISHED:
(AND WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM FRIENDS) (Iris C. Geik et al. eds., LexisNexis MB 2005)
(1967); Francesco Parisi & Catherine Ševčenko, Lessons from the Anticommons: The
Economics of New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 90 KY. L.J. 295 (2002).
22
See generally Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and
Economics of Intellectual Property, 5 J. ECON. PERS. 3, 11–18 (1991) (emphasizing the
need to provide authors with incentives to make works in the first place, given the
likelihood that without legal protection and subject to the costs of copying the work, the
work would be copied); Wendy J. Gordon & Robert G. Bone, Copyright, in II
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 189 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest
eds., 2000) [hereinafter Gordon & Bone, Copyright]; William M. Landes & Richard
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989)
[hereinafter Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law]. A different
point of view focuses on the need to internalize the positive externalities created by a
work of authorship. See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 257, 284–90 (2007).
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already been made.23 Under the incentive view, I argue that the
incentives should aim at the risk associated with some aspects of
creating the work and with the optimal use of the work, for the
benefit of both the owners and the public. The public’s interest—
lest we forget—is the goal of copyright law, whereas the rights
awarded to the author are the means to achieve the public interest
in promoting the creative process.24 Accordingly, one criterion for
allocating ownership is identifying the party who bears the risks
associated with the production of the work.25 Wishing to avoid a
case-by-case solution and uncertainty, the task is to identify typical
situations. The economic analysis of Tasini warns against
allocations that are to be instantly corrected. Thus, we should add
the temporal axis and evaluate different “Coasean moments”26
when querying the possibility of a corrective transaction.27
Shaping the allocation default rule28 is thus crucial. An
economic intuition would be to design a penalty default rule that
would allocate initial ownership to the employee, expecting the
employer to contract around this default rule.29 This expected
response would act as a signal to the employee that ownership is at
stake. I argue that where the unequal power of the parties extends
beyond information deficiencies, which is the typical situation in
the employment context, a penalty default rule is likely to fail.

23
See generally I.T. Hardy, An Economic Understanding of Copyright Law’s WorkMade-for-Hire Doctrine, 12 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 181 (1988); Parisi & Ševčenko,
supra note 21.
24
See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy
behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction
that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance
public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful
Arts.’”).
25
Hardy, supra note 23, at 192, 195.
26
I borrow the term from Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Commodifying Collaborative
Research, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 397, 405 (Niva Elkin-Koren &
Neil Weinstock Netanel eds., 2002) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, Commodifying Collaborative
Research].
27
See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960).
28
See Ian Ayers & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 97–100 (1989) (introducing the idea
of penalty default rules).
29
Id. at 91.
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transaction

and

As for employment law, Part III builds on previous literature to
unpack the conventional description of the employment
relationship as one of unequal bargaining power.30 Factors internal
to the employment relationship (bounded rationality, asymmetry of
information) and external thereto (lock-in costs, hold-out
problems, the employment market) are identified. Insights
borrowed from game theory about the difference between one-shot
games and repeat games add to the understanding of the
relationship.
The integrated copyright-employment analysis concludes that
the law should search for typical cases, in which we can identify ex
ante the party who bears the risks associated with making the work
in the first place, usually the employer/commissioning party, while
assuring informed consent on behalf of the other party, usually the
employee-author, and avoiding allocations which are likely to be
instantly corrected by the market without compensation.31 This
general framework is then further fine-tuned, arguing that the law
should take into consideration the kind of employer (whether it is a
cultural industry,32 whether its business model is centralized, e.g., a
music label, or decentralized, e.g., an independent film producer)
and the kind of employee (whether he is a “Bryant” or “Miller,”
i.e., was he hired to make works of authorship or not).
The conclusion offers moderate support for the current workmade-for-hire doctrine, with some proposed modifications to the
interpretation of the scope element of the doctrine. It also
advocates greater use of written job descriptions in the creative
30

Guy Davidov, The Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated: ‘Employee’ as a
Viable (Though Overly-Used) Legal Concept, in BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF LABOUR
LAW: GOALS AND MEANS IN THE REGULATION OF WORK 133, 138–43 (Guy Davidov &
Brian Langille eds., 2006) [hereinafter Davidov, The Reports of My Death Are Greatly
Exaggerated].
31
See generally Jacob, supra note 16.
32
The term “culture industry” originates from THEODORE W. ADORNO, THE CULTURE
INDUSTRY: SELECTED ESSAYS ON MASS CULTURE (J. M. Bernstein ed., 2001) (1991), who
used it in the critique of what cultural critics would later call the consumerist society, or
the society of spectacle, applying the term offered in GUY DEBORD, SOCIETY OF THE
SPECTACLE (Kenn Knabb trans., New ed. 2006) (1967).

C02_BIRNHACK_ARTICLE_123009_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2009]

WHO OWNS BRATZ?

12/30/2009 10:47:12 AM

103

employment market. Thus, this article offers a more solid
explanation for current law with some interpretive proposals.
Under this analysis, Mattel should indeed own Bratz, but Miller
should have owned the software he wrote.
I. THE ALLOCATION SPECTRUM
Current legal doctrine contains hidden assumptions about the
creative process, about cultural markets, about the workplace, and
about the relationship between employers and employees. The two
elements of the work-made-for-hire doctrine, employment and
scope,33 assume a dichotomous world, in which an author is either
an employee or an independent contractor;34 in which a work of
authorship can be created either within the scope of the workplace
or outside it.35 The result, not surprisingly, is also dichotomous;
ownership belongs to one party alone. However, each of these
factors is more complex and dynamic, and the overall interaction is
in a constant state of change. Advanced technology, new business
models, economic developments, globalization, and changing
social norms all impact the production of creative works.36 This
Part briefly comments on these changes (Part I.A), and instead of a
binary allocation, offers a spectrum of legal choices (Part I.B).37 It
then adds a legal layer on top of this spectrum (Part I.C). I discuss
the U.S. doctrine and the German approach, which is the most
elaborated existing alternative. Another aspect of this discussion is
the way the market responds to the legal layer. The 2001 Tasini
case and its aftermath serve as an important lesson for policy
makers (Part I.D).

33

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
See infra Part I.C.3.
35
17 U.S.C. § 101.
36
See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 4–5 (2006).
37
For criticism of the binary effect of the work-made-for-hire doctrine, see Nancy S.
Kim, Martha Graham, Professor Miller and the ‘Work for Hire’ Doctrine: Undoing the
Judicial Bind Created by the Legislature, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 337 (2006) (proposing a
particularized analysis that emphasizes the expectations of the parties).
34
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A. Modes of Production and Employment
There are many modes of cultural production. Patronage
represents a European medieval form of sponsored creativity.38
Modern copyright law, dated to the English Statute of Anne of
1709,39 replaced the patronage system with economic incentives
for creativity.40 The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries witnessed
the birth of the romantic author, who is apparent in the text and
sub-text of much of copyright law as we know it.41 This is the
Author’s Copyright. The twentieth century saw the rise of the
Corporate Copyright,42 i.e., works of authorship created within the
hierarchical setting of a firm, or more generally, the workplace,
governed by the doctrine of work-made-for-hire.43 Catherine Fisk
aptly noted that “[t]he author isn’t dead; he just got a job.”44 The
employed author did not replace the independent author and many
authors are independent contractors, rather than salaried
employees.45 The law now treats all workplaces in a unified
38

See MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 16–17
(1993).
39
1709, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
40
ROSE, supra note 38, at 16–17.
41
Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphosis of “Authorship,”
1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 455 (discussing the romantic author and the law); see also Martha
Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the
Emergence of the Author, 17 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY STUD. 425, 426 (1984) (arguing that
the romantic author is a social construction). For a different account, see Oren Bracha,
The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets and Liberal Virtues in Early
American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186, 202 (2008).
42
Corporate Copyright entered copyright law with the introduction of the work-madefor-hire doctrine in the Copyright Act of 1909, an amendment which is said to have been
added “in a most casual manner.” See L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE
NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS 85–88 (1991); SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN,
COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT
THREATENS CREATIVITY 101–03 (2001); Catherine L. Fisk, Authors at Work: The Origins
of the Work-for-Hire Doctrine, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 55–56, 62–67 (2003)
[hereinafter Fisk, Authors at Work] (providing the history of the doctrine, describing
corporate copyright as “the ultimate legal fiction underlying modern copyright law,” and
discussing the enactment of the doctrine in the 1909 Copyright Act).
43
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b) (2006).
44
Fisk, Authors at Work, supra note 42, at 1.
45
Ruth Towse, Copyright Policy, Cultural Policy and Support for Artists, in THE
ECONOMICS OF COPYRIGHT: DEVELOPMENTS IN RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS 66, 68 (Wendy
J. Gordon & Richard Watt eds., 2003) [hereinafter Towse, Copyright Policy]. Ruth
Towse reports several surveys of artists in several developed countries, all show that
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manner,46 but one size does not fit all. A privately owned firm is
different from the government as an employer, research
universities are different from a commercial publisher, and a giant
software firm is different from the local architecture studio. The
focus here will be on private firms, leaving aside unique
considerations that are relevant to particular workplaces.47
Today, in post-modern times, copyright scholars are
increasingly aware of other forms of creative production such as
non-western communal authorship48 and collaborative research.49
As our lives go digital, more attention is devoted to various forms
of peer production, such as open source projects and wikis.50
Nonetheless, corporate copyright, despite the rise of peer
production, still accounts for a vast amount of works.51
Working patterns also change. Technology enables working
outside the office in many sectors; broadband internet connection
“artists are mostly self-employed, work long hours on short term contracts, and
experience higher than average unemployment . . . they receive below national average
earnings.” Id.
46
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 9, WORKS MADE FOR HIRE UNDER THE 1976
COPYRIGHT ACT 1 (2004), available at http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ09.pdf.
47
An important unique consideration in the university context, for example, is
academic freedom, which is irrelevant to other workplaces. Judge Posner noted that if
the issue had to be decided, he might have concluded that the teacher’s exception
survived the 1976 Act. Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 416–17 (7th Cir.
1988). See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the
Copyright Act of 1976, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 590 (1987) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, The Creative
Employee]; Georgia Holmes & Daniel A. Levin, Who Owns Course Materials Prepared
by a Teacher or Professor? The Application of Copyright Law to Teaching Materials in
the Internet Age, 2000 BYU EDU. & L.J. 165; Kim, supra note 37, at 357–62; Gregory
Kent Laughlin, Who Owns Copyright to Faculty-Created Web Sites?: The Work-for-Hire
Doctrine’s Applicability to Internet Resources Created for Distance Learning and
Traditional Classroom Courses, 41 B.C. L. REV. 549 (2000). Works prepared by
university professors might differ from a school teacher’s preparation of tests. Shaul v.
Cherry Valley-Springfield Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 F.3d 177, 186 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding
that a teacher’s preparation of tests falls within the scope of employment, hence copyright
belongs to the employer).
48
Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 285 (2006); see also JAMES BOYLE,
SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY 195 (1996).
49
See Dreyfuss, Commodifying Collaborative Research, supra note 26, at 405.
50
See BENKLER, supra note 36, at 218–19; see also Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Wealth
Without Markets?, 116 YALE L.J. 1472, 1493–94 (2007).
51
See BENKLER, supra note 36, at 462–63.
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and wireless access allow employees to work from the home,
internet café or nearby park.52 Work occurs outside the physical
location of the workplace and outside the usual working hours.53
The ubiquity of personal computers further blurs the traditional
image of the workplace towards a more flexible environment. The
result is that it is no longer easy to rely on clear evidence as to the
time, place and manner of making the work of authorship (the
traditional scope element of the work-made-for-hire doctrine)54 to
determine whether it was made within the scope of employment or
not.
Globalization further changes the modes of production. Local
firms are more active in the global market; firms become
multinational, spreading production and management in various
locations around the world and relocating them according to their
needs.55 Furthermore, firms experience changes in their identity,
due to bankruptcy, mergers and acquisitions. The absence of a
unified global rule regarding ownership of creative works made
within the context of the workplace,56 together with different legal
models applied in various places, require global employees and the
cosmopolitan authors to figure out the issue themselves.
B. The Allocation Spectrum
The law has a wide range of options to choose from regarding
the initial allocation of ownership of copyrighted works in the
workplace. Legislatures face the task of choosing the best point on
this allocation spectrum and courts face the task of implementing
the legislative choice of allocation. The variables that form the
allocation spectrum are the first owner of the copyrighted work
(the employer or the employee) and the transferability of the right
(ranging from a fully transferable right to an inalienable right).
52

See U.S. Department of Labor, Work at Home in 2004 (Sept. 22, 2005),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/homey.nr0.htm (reporting that in May 2004, 20.7
million Americans worked at home; 13.7 million of them were wage and salary
employees).
53
Id.
54
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
55
See BENKLER, supra note 36, at 4–5.
56
See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
5.03[B][1][c] (2009).
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Different jurisdictions chose different points on this allocation
spectrum; the American model and the recently amended German
model represent and illustrate the width of the allocation spectrum.
Table 1
1
employer

2

3

4

5

6

employee
1. Corporate Copyright: Full Employer ownership;
transferable right
2. Joint ownership
3. Shop right
4. Full employee ownership; transferable right
5. Initial ownership to employee, with limitations on
transferability
6. Inalienable ownership to employee

On one end of the allocation spectrum, [1] lays the corporate
copyright. The law may award the ownership in the copyrighted
work to the employer if two conditions are met, which compose
the work-made-for-hire doctrine: that the work was created by an
employee, and that the work was made within the scope of
employment.57 Once these conditions are fulfilled, the employer is
free to transfer the rights to whomever he or she wishes, whether it
is a third party or the employee, or to license the use of the work.58
The employer is free to apply an internal compensation scheme,
whether it is part of the employment contract or a unilateral
measure.59 In other words, the employer enjoys full ownership,
unbounded by the fact that the author was an employee. If the
conditions are not met, then the ownership vests with the author
alone, no strings attached [point [4]].
57

17 U.S.C. § 101. The other option under U.S. law is that the parties to the
transaction agree that the work will be considered as a work-made-for-hire, an option that
is limited to specific categories of works. Id.
58
See id. § 201.
59
See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 56, § 5.03[B][1][ii].
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A second possible point, [2], would be to award the initial
ownership of the work to both parties, i.e., joint ownership of the
employee and the employer. Note that this would be a statutory
allocation, which differs from the current joint ownership rule
found in the Copyright Act.60 This might seem fair and just and
hence an attractive solution, but would often be an inefficient
allocation. The parties might disagree about how to utilize the
work, resulting in either overuse by one party, which would be a
situation of a “tragedy of the commons,”61 or hold-outs by
employees or inaction by the employer, which would be a situation
of the tragedy of the anti-commons.62
Allocation [3] would award the ownership to the employee, but
would acknowledge the employer’s non-exclusive non-transferable
right to use the work for free.63 This situation can be viewed as
either a license under a property rule or as a property rule that is
shifted into a liability rule.64 This model is borrowed from patent
60

17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A ‘joint work’ is a work prepared by two or more authors with the
intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a
unitary whole.”). Joint owners are treated as tenants in common, i.e., each of the owners
has an independent right to use or license the work, though he or she should account to
the joint owners for any profits. Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 2007). To reach
a conclusion about joint ownership, a court should find that each author made an
independently copyrightable contribution to the work. See, e.g., Ashton-Tate Corp. v.
Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1990). At the time of making the contribution “the
authors must intend their contributions to be merged into inseparable or interdependent
parts of a unitary whole.” Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 2000).
Applying as-is the doctrine to a work made by an employee is unlikely to yield a
conclusion about joint ownership, as the employer’s contribution might be a general
instruction to the employee, i.e., an idea how to make a certain work, but not an
independently copyrightable contribution. Intention is also unlikely to be shared in the
way required by the joint ownership rule.
61
Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968).
62
Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anti-Commons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 622 (1998) (arguing that multiple
ownerships might result in a deadlock).
63
One scholar proposed that in such cases the hiring party might enjoy an implied
license to use the work. Scott J. Burnham, The Interstices of Copyright Law and Contract
Law: Finding the Terms of an Implied Nonexclusive License in a Failed Work for Hire,
46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 333, 351 (1999). This view inserts contract law principles into
the copyright law context.
64
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092–93 (1972)
(discussing the distinction between property rules and liability rules).
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law.65 Patent law does not include a statutory work-made-for-hire
doctrine, but does acknowledge an equitable doctrine called shop
right.66 In the absence of a contract between the employee who
reached an invention using the employer’s facilities, courts base
the employer’s right to use the invention on implied contract or on
principles of equity and fairness.67 The right is limited in its scope,
but allows the use of the invention by the employer without
transferring it to third parties.68 Incorporating the patent shop right
in copyright law would result in employee ownership that is
subject to the employer’s right to use the work.69 The parallel
entitlement of the employee and the employer is likely to result in
a problematic commercial management of the work.
65

For a discussion of ownership of patents within the workplace, see Robert P.
Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1
(1999). Comparison between copyright and patent in this area should be attentive to
crucial differences between the law, economics and business practices of the creative
process resulting in a copyrighted work of authorship and the innovation process,
resulting in a patented invention. For the differences between copyrighted works and
patented inventions in this context, see Burk & McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis,
supra note 11, at 594. First, the financial and legal risks involved in creating copyrighted
works or patentable inventions are sharply different. Inventions take place mostly within
industries and firms. Id. Second, copyright subsists in an original work once it is created.
Id. No registration or publication is required. Id. Hence, enjoying legal protection is
immediate and cheap. Patents, by contrast, require a lengthy and expensive process of
registration with the Patent Office, and there is no guarantee that the PTO will award the
patent. See id. at 593. Third, the patent registration process requires that the owner of the
invention is asserted. See 35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (2006). Thus, the issue of ownership
arises in a relatively early point in the relationship between the employer and the
inventor/employee.
66
See McElmurry v. Ark. Power & Light Co., 995 F.2d 1576, 1580–82 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (discussing the normative basis of the doctrine and instructing that acknowledging
the right should be the result of considering the totality of the circumstances on a case by
case basis). This rule developed in the common law in the nineteenth century. Id. at
1580–81. It was initially based on the employee’s consent and later the theoretical basis
shifted to the employment contract. Id. at 1581; see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
AGENCY § 397 cmt. b (1933). For a discussion of the roots of the doctrine, see Catherine
L. Fisk, Removing the ‘Fuel of Interest’ from the ‘Fire of Genius’: Law and the
Employee-Inventor, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1151–64 (1998) [hereinafter Fisk, Law and
the Employee-Inventor].
67
Burk, Intellectual Property, supra note 11, at 15–16 (explaining the legal basis of
the doctrine and suggesting that the absence of a work-made-for-hire doctrine might be
the result of a notion of the romantic inventor).
68
Id. at 16.
69
Congress refused to incorporate patent shop right in the Copyright Act. See Peter S.
Menell & David Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95 CAL. L. REV. 941, 991 (2007).
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Allocation [4] awards the right to the author-employee with no
limitations attached so that the employee can do with the work
whatever he or she wishes, including transferring it to third parties
or to the employer. This situation mirrors the allocation to the
employer [1]. Hence, the points to its right lie beyond the original
spectrum, or put differently, beyond the Anglo-American
spectrum. This is where Continental law enters.
Allocation [5], which does not have a parallel on the
employer’s side of the spectrum, would be initial allocation to the
author, but with some limitations attached to the ownership, or
more precisely, on the transferability thereof. For example, the
law could award the employee the initial ownership and allow her
to transfer the right but only for a limited time, whereas at the end
of the limited period, full ownership of the employee would
resume. Alternatively, the law could allow the author to terminate
the transfer under some circumstances, such as if the employer
fails to utilize the work.
Allocation [6] awards inalienable ownership to the employee.
Such a (hypothetical) right would not enable the author-employeeowner to transfer his or her rights to any party. However, in order
to enable some efficiency it should allow the author to grant a nonexclusive license to use the work. Such a limited right would be,
on this theoretical account, accompanied with limitations on
waiving the rights. This is an overly paternalistic and extreme
option, which runs afoul of fundamental principles of the free
market and of property rights as we know them.70 However, in
some jurisdictions the case of moral rights does not fall far from
this option.71 Moral rights are often inalienable and some
70

For a similar point regarding real property, see generally RICHARD POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 81 (7th ed. 2007) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW].
71
See Adolf Dietz, The Moral Right of the Author, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 199,
208–09 (1995) (discussing the concept of inalienable moral rights in Germany, Austria,
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the Slovac Republic and the author’s ability to allow
so-called concessions (licenses) of rights to use work which can be granted as nonexclusive or exclusive rights for all uses, limited or unlimited as to place, time and
purpose); Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353,
372–79 (2006) (discussing an author’s application of moral rights in France, Germany
and Italy against persons authorized to use the copyright by contract).
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jurisdictions prohibit waiving them.72 Further, unwaiveable rights
are not a foreign concept in employment law.73
More points could be added to the allocation spectrum. Indeed,
the choice of the point of allocation differs among different
jurisdictions. Thus far we have seen the range of options. Before
we turn to a normative analysis, I would like to super-impose the
legal layer upon the spectrum.
C. The Law: Two Models
Several current legal models illustrate the allocation spectrum,
roughly divided into two main manifestations: the first is the
Anglo-American model, namely the U.S. model and the U.K.
model,74 which is found also in other jurisdictions where English
law has influenced the legal system,75 and the second is the Civil
Law model.76 The general rule under both models vests the initial
72

Inalienability of moral rights is mostly a European Continental phenomenon, though
there is no uniformity among countries such as Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the
Netherlands. See Dietz, supra note 71, at 220–21.
73
See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006) (setting minimum
wages, maximum hours and child labor provisions).
74
Compare Copyright, Designs and Patent Act, 1988, c. 48, § 11(2) (Eng.) (“Where a
literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work is made by an employee in the course of his
employment, his employer is the first owner of any copyright in the work subject to any
agreement to the contrary.”), with 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006) (“In the case of a work
made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is
considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly
agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised
in the copyright.”).
75
See, e.g., Canada Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42, § 13(3) (1985) (“Where the
author of a work was in the employment of some other person under a contract of service
or apprenticeship and the work was made in the course of his employment by that person,
the person by whom the author was employed shall, in the absence of any agreement to
the contrary, be the first owner of the copyright . . . .”). This is based on the English Act
of 1911, Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46 (Eng.). J.A.L. STERLING, WORLD
COPYRIGHT LAW 983 (1998). See also a case recently decided by the Supreme Court of
Appeal of South Africa, King v. SA Weather Service 2008 (143) SCA (S. Afr.).
76
This is an admitted generalization for the clarity of the discussion. For a survey of
copyright law in several Civil Law jurisdictions, see INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF
EUROPE 62, 103, 221, 270, 335, 356, 373, 423 (George Metaxas-Maranghidis ed., 1995)
(discussing the ownership of works created by employees in Belgium, Denmark, Iceland,
Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland); STERLING, supra note 75, at 169–70, 352
(1998) (discussing French, German, Greek, and Dutch law); KENNETH D. CREWS &
JACQUE RAMOS, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW:
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ownership with the author,77 but diverges after this first step.
Common law jurisdictions accompany the initial allocation to the
author with an explicit or implicit permission to transfer the
(material) rights,78 and with rules addressing works made for
hire.79 If the statutory conditions for a work-made-for-hire are
met, then the initial allocation lies not with the author but with the
employer.80 In such a case, the employer is considered to be the
legal author.81 In contrast, the German model allows the author to
grant the right to use the work (“exploitation right”), but the
ownership remains with the author, even if the work was created
by an employee within the scope of the employment.82
1. U.S. Initial Allocation
Under the U.S. model, there are two situations in which a work
might be considered a work-made-for-hire. The first refers to
works made by employees and by implication excludes
independent contractors, subject to the general rule that an author
is the owner of the original work he or she made.83 The second
ISSUES FOR UNIVERSITY SCHOLARSHIP (2005), http://copyright.surf.nl/copyright/files/
International_Comparative_Chart_Zwolle_III_rev071306.pdf; CHRISTINE KIRCHBERGER
ET AL., OWNERSHIP OF THE COPYRIGHT IN WORKS AND THE PATENT RIGHT IN INVENTIONS
CREATED BY EMPLOYEES IN FINLAND, SWEDEN, GERMANY, AUSTRIA, THE UNITED
KINGDOM, ESTONIA AND ARGENTINA (2002), http://www.juridicum.su.se/user/sawo/Pub
likationer/Wolk%20nr%20120.pdf.
77
17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (“Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in
the author or authors of the work . . . .”); Copyright, Designs and Patent Act, 1988, c. 48,
§ 11(1) (Eng.) (“The author of a work is the first owner of any copyright in it . . . .”);
Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetz] [UrhG]
[Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBl. I § 31 (F.R.G.). For an English translation, see
Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights (Copyright Law),
http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/pdf/en/de/de080en.pdf.
78
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 201(d); Copyright, Designs and Patent Act, 1988, c. 48, § 90
(Eng.).
79
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 201(b); Copyright, Designs and Patent Act, 1988, c. 48, §
11(2) (Eng.).
80
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 201(b); Copyright, Designs and Patent Act, 1988, c. 48, §
11(2) (Eng.).
81
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 201(b); Copyright, Designs and Patent Act, 1988, c. 48, §
11(2) (Eng.).
82
Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetz]
[UrhG] [Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBl. I § 31 (F.R.G.).
83
17 U.S.C. § 101.
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situation refers to commissioned works, and will be discussed
shortly.
For the employer to own the work, the work-made-for-hire
doctrine requires proving two elements: employment, and a causal
connection between the work and the employment, i.e., that it was
made within the scope of employment.84 If these elements are met,
the employer is considered the first owner of the copyright, even
though the employee was the author.85 On the allocation spectrum
this would be point [1].86 Initial allocation means that there is no
transfer of the copyright from the author-employee to the
employer, but rather that the employer is the first owner.87 If the
author is not an employee or the work was made outside the scope
of employment, then the initial ownership vests with the author
[point [4] of the allocation spectrum].88 In either case, there is no
legal barrier prohibiting the parties to contract around the initial
allocation as they see fit, be it before or after the work is made.89

84

Id.
Id. § 201 (b).
86
See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
87
See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a), (b).
88
See supra Part I.B; see also NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 56, §
5.03[B][1][b][i], [ii]. Such post-allocation would be a transfer of the copyright and
should not be confused with the initial allocation. The distinction matters. Some rules
that apply to a work-made-for-hire do not apply to other works. For example, a work of
visual art that enjoys some moral rights under 17 U.S.C. § 106(A) does not apply to a
work-made-for-hire. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. Another difference is the duration of a workmade-for-hire. See id. § 302(c) (“In the case of . . . a work made for hire, the copyright
endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its first publication, or a term of 120 years
from the year of its creation, whichever expires first.”). A third important difference is
that while ordinary transfers of copyright ownership can be terminated under some
conditions, a work-made-for-hire is ineligible for such termination. See id. § 203(a)(3).
For discussion, see David Nimmer, Peter S. Menell & Diane McGimsey, Pre-Existing
Confusion in Copyright’s Work-for-Hire Doctrine, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 399 (2003).
For a full discussion of the implications of treating a work as made for hire, see NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 56, § 5.03[A]. Moreover, transactions done after initial
allocation might have tax implications. Id. § 19.03[B], 19.03[B][.05].
89
See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (stating that an employer is the author of a work-made-forhire, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a signed writing).
85
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2. Agency Law in Copyright Law
The statute is silent as to the details of either element of the
work-made-for-hire, leaving their interpretation to the courts.
Initially, courts turned to various tests found in employment law to
determine who is an employee and to determine the scope of
employment: (1) a “control test,” i.e., whether the hiring party
retained the right to control the product; (2) an examination of
whether the hiring party actually had such control; (3) a formal
test, acknowledging employment only when the other party was a
salaried employee; or (4) an interpretation borrowed from agency
law.90 In evaluating who is an employee, the Supreme Court opted
for an agency law test.91 The Court adopted a rather formalistic
and conservative interpretation, deferring to Congress, and relying
on the text and structure of the Copyright Act.92 The legislative
history, as analyzed by the Court, supported this interpretation.93
The agency test provided a list of inconclusive factors to be
considered on an ad hoc basis.94 While it might have clarified
90

Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 738–40 (1989) (discussing
various tests); see also NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 56, § 5.03[B][1][a]. The
distinction between salaried employees (those who are under a contract of service) and
independent contractors who provide their services to a hiring party (those under a
contract for service) is a bedrock principle of the Common Law and is reflected in the
language of the Canadian model, which is based on the old English model. See Canada
Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42, § 139 13(3) (1985).
91
CCNV, 490 U.S at 742–43.
92
Id. at 739–40. For discussion, see Jacob, supra note 16. Nimmer explains that the
Court’s standard focuses on the right to control the manner and means of production
rather than the product itself. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 56, §
5.03[B][1][a][iii].
93
See CCNV, 490 U.S. at 743–49. One scholar argued that the Court misinterpreted
the legislative history and created an uncertain test. Michael B. Landau, “Works Made for
Hire” After Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid: The Need for Statutory
Reform and the Importance of Contract, 9 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 107, 148–49
(1990) (advocating the amendment of the Copyright Act to incorporate the formal
“salaried employee” test).
94
CCNV, 490 U.S. at 751. Factors used to determine whether a hired party is an
employee under common law of agency include:
[T]he hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by which
the product is accomplished . . . ; the skill required; the source of the
instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of
the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the
right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the
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which legal standard should be applied, the test itself remains
foggy and difficult to anticipate or to apply.95 Uncertainty affects
the parties’ behavior, to the extent that they are aware of it. Those
who know about the test applied by courts might opt for contracts,
pre-assigning the ownership.
In interpreting the scope element, courts again turned to agency
law and applied a three-prong test.96 Accordingly, a work is
considered to have been made within the scope of employment if
(1) it is of the kind for which the employee was hired; and (2) the
work was made substantially within the time and space limits, and
(3) the work was made, at least in part, with a purpose to serve the
employer’s interests.97 Later on we shall return to the agency test.

hired party’s discretion over when and how long to work; the method
of payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants;
whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party;
whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee
benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.
Id. (citations omitted).
95
The Court of Appeals in the Second Circuit, applying the CCNV tests, noted that
“[t]he Reid test is a list of factors not all of which may come into play in a given case.
The Reid test is therefore easily misapplied.” Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77,
85 (2d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). Ironically, the Supreme Court in CCNV pointed to
predictability and certainty as Congress’ paramount goal in enacting the 1976 Copyright
Act. CCNV, 490 U.S. at 749; see also NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 56, §
5.03[B][1][a][iii].
96
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(2) (2000). Shortly after CCNV was
decided, one commentator advocated applying the agency test to the scope element. See
Robert A. Kreiss, Scope of Employment and Being an Employee Under the Work-Madefor-Hire Provision of the Copyright Law: Applying the Common-Law Agency Tests, 40
U. KAN. L. REV. 119 (1991). The justifications provided for this approach are cannons of
statutory interpretation and the convenience of providing a developed framework. Id. at
131–32. I find both reasons unconvincing, as the statute is silent about the meaning of
the elements of the work-made-for-hire doctrine and the need for a framework does not in
itself justify the particular choice. Kreiss himself struggled with applying doctrines
admittedly taken from the context of tort law. See id. at 129–30 (speculating about the
third test of the agency element of the scope element); id. at 139 (trying to justify the
arbitrary effect of borrowing tort law concepts by inserting them in the copyright law
context).
97
See, e.g., Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, No. 94-2364, 1995 WL 541610, at *4 (4th Cir.
Sept. 13, 1995) (applying the Agency test and noting that all three elements must be
considered); Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 571–72 (4th Cir. 1994).
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Importantly, as noted by Assaf Jacob, the agency law tests are
derived from tort law, rather than from an independent analysis of
employment law.98
3. Independent Contractors
An important difference between the U.S. and U.K. models is
found in the situation of a commissioned work. Current U.K. law
is silent about commissioned works, subjecting them to the general
rule that the author is the copyright owner and leaving any
subsequent transfers entirely to the market:99 the author can
transfer his or her rights to the commissioner of the work.100 U.S.
law treats commissioned works as works made for hire only if
three conditions are met:101 first, that the work was specially
ordered or commissioned;102 second, that the work is to be used for
at least one of nine listed statutory categories, such as a
contribution to a collective work, a motion picture or an
instructional text;103 and third, that the parties expressly agreed in a
98

Jacob, supra note 16, at 124.
The U.K. Copyright Act, 1911 addressed commissioned works of a particular kind:
Where, in the case of an engraving, photograph or portrait, the plate
or other original was ordered by some other person and was made for
valuable consideration, in pursuance of that order, in the absence of
any agreement to the contrary, the person by whom the plate or other
original was ordered shall be the first owner of the copyright.
Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46, § 5(1)(a) (Eng.). This special treatment was
eliminated in subsequent Acts. 1 COPINGER & SKONE JAMES ON COPYRIGHT §§ 5–32
(Kevin Garnett et al. eds., 15th ed. 2005).
100
In the U.K., the transfer can be explicit, i.e., in a written contract, or implicit. See
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988 c. 48, § 90(a) (Eng.). Indeed, courts found that
there was an equitable transfer of rights in some circumstances. See WILLIAM R. CORNISH
& DAVID LLEWELYN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADE MARKS
AND ALLIED RIGHTS 472 (5th ed. 2003); SIMON STOKES, ART AND COPYRIGHT 156–59
(2001).
101
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). For the legislative history of this prong of the doctrine,
see Nimmer, Menell & McGimsey, Pre-Existing Confusion, supra note 88.
102
17 U.S.C. § 101.
103
Id. The enumerated categories require explanation for their inclusion in the statute,
as well as the categories missing from the list. One possible answer is political, and
suggests that the categories are the result of successful political pressure by interested
groups. Burk, Intellectual Property, supra note 11, at 13; see also Matt Stahl, Recording
Artists, Work for Hire, Employment and Appropriation 1–3 (Oct. 23, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1288831 (discussing the rather
99
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written and signed instrument that the work shall be considered a
work-made-for-hire.104 This means that works commissioned for
other purposes or works commissioned with no specific written
agreement remain the author’s.105 The author is free to license or
transfer the copyright as he or she sees fit.106 Accordingly, the
question which may arise is whether the work falls within the
category of a commissioned work to begin with and if the answer
is positive, then disputes might evolve around the interpretation of
the contract between the commissioning party and the author.
4. The German Model
Civil Law provides a different model for ownership of
employees’ works.107 The general approach is that the author is
the initial owner if the work is made within the scope of the
employment,108 as in points [4], [5] or [6].109 Civil law
jurisdictions differ on their choice among these points.
Interestingly, even when the choice is [4], in which the employee
can freely transfer his or her rights to anyone, the law sets some
boundaries to this transfer or grant of exploitation rights, namely
the transfer is subject to a principle of “limited purpose”: This
limitation means that if the contract is unclear or incomplete, the
transfer of rights or the license granted are interpreted narrowly, to
cover only those rights that are related to the employment and
leaving any residual rights to the author.110

curious case of sound recordings which were added to the list of enumerated categories
and then eliminated). A second explanation suggests that the enumerated categories are
works that require multi-party coordination. Id. at 12–14.
104
17 U.S.C. § 101.
105
Id.
106
Id. § 201(d).
107
An important exception to the Civil law model, found in the European Union,
instructs that material rights in software prepared by employees belong to the employer.
See Council Directive 91/250, art. 2(3), 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42, 42–46 (EC);
KIRCHBERGER, supra note 76, at 7–8 (explaining that the Directive was implemented
throughout the E.U.).
108
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
109
See discussion in text supra Part I.B.
110
See KIRCHBERGER, supra note 76, at 10, 13–14.
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The German Copyright Act111 provides an elaborate scheme of
ownership or more precisely, a detailed regulation of copyright
contracts. The Act was amended in 2002112 and again in 2007.113
Under current German law, the ownership is allocated to the
author,114 who cannot transfer the rights. However, the author can
allow other parties, including the employer,115 to use the work.
This is the exploitation right (Nutzungsrecht),116 which was

111

Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetz]
[UrhG] [Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBl. I at 1273 (F.R.G.), available at Gesetz im
Internet, http://bundesrecht.juris.de. For an English translation, see Law on Copyright
and Neighboring Rights (Copyright Law),
http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/pdf/en/de/de080en.pdf.
112
See Gesetz zur Stärkung der vertraglichen Stellung von Urhebern und ausübenden
Künstlern [Act on Strengthening the Contractual Position of Authors and Performers],
Mar. 28, 2002, BGBl. I at 1155 (F.R.G.). For a summary of the 2002 amendment and its
legislative history, see generally Bettina C. Goldmann, New Law on Copyright Contracts
in Germany, 9 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW 17 (2002). For analysis, see Reto M. Hilty &
Alexander Peukert, “Equitable Remuneration” in Copyright Law: The Amended German
Copyright Act as a Trap for the Entertainment Industry in the U.S.?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 401, 416–21 (2004). See generally Gerhard Schricker, Efforts for a Better
Law on Copyright Contracts in Germany—A Never-Ending Story?, 35 INT’L REV.
INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 850 (2004) (discussing the German Copyright Act and
the 2002 amendment and its implications).
113
See Second Act Governing Copyright in the Information Society [Second Basket],
Jan. 1, 2008, BGBl. I at 2513 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.bgblportal.de/BGBL/
bgbl1f/bgbl107s2513.pdf. The 2007 amendment, popularly referred to as the “second
basket” of amendments of the copyright act for the information society, deals with
various other aspects, which are not discussed in this article, such as compensation for
owners for private copying and uses of public libraries. See id. The amendment entered
into force on January 1, 2008. For commentary, see generally Stefan Krempl, German
Parliament Passes New Copyright Act, HEISE ONLINE, July 6, 2007,
http://www.heise.de/english/newsticker/news/92318. I am indebted to Zohar Efroni and
Clemens Kochinke for their assistance with German copyright law.
114
See Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetz]
[UrhG] [Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBl. I § 11 (F.R.G.) (“Copyright shall protect
the author . . . with respect to utilization of his work.”).
115
Id. § 43 (applying articles dealing with the exploitation rights to an author who has
“created the work in execution of his duties under a contract of employment or service
provided nothing to the contrary transpires from the terms or nature of the contract of
employment or service.”); see also Schricker, supra note 112, at 852. For discussion of
the German legal framework, see KIRCHBERGER, supra note 76, at 13–15.
116
See Schricker, supra note 112, at 852.

C02_BIRNHACK_ARTICLE_123009_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2009]

WHO OWNS BRATZ?

12/30/2009 10:47:12 AM

119

described by a leading German copyright scholar as a “sort of
surrogate for the assignment of copyright.”117
The law imposes further limitations on the author’s power to
make transactions and provides her with a set of (protective) rights,
as well as supportive background rules.118 Located on the
allocation spectrum, the German model is best understood to be in
between points [5] and [6]. Several rules in the German Copyright
Act empower the employee-author vis-à-vis the employer. First,
any grant of exploitation rights is interpreted according to the
purpose of the grant.119 However, it is reported that this limitation
on the transferability is bypassed by contracts which attempt to
detail every possible use.120 One can assume that the more
sophisticated parties bypass this limitation more often than the less
sophisticated ones.121 Second, uses of the work which were not
bargained for by the parties ex ante, are not granted automatically
to the employer, but are to be determined.122 Until the 2007
amendment came into force in 2008, the law voided the grant of
unknown uses.123 For example, a contract regarding an analog
work created at a time that no digitization technology was
available could not address (then) future digital uses, but if it
nevertheless did attempt to allow such future uses, the contractual
clause granting the exploitation rights was considered void.124 The
117

Id. at 852. Karl-Nikolaus Peifer pointed to me that the literal translation of
Nutzungsrecht is “usage right”.
118
See id. at 852–56.
119
See Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetz]
[UrhG] [Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBl. I § 31(5) (F.R.G.).
120
See Schricker, supra note 112, at 853.
121
See id.
122
See Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetz]
[UrhG] [Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBl. I § 31(5) (F.R.G.); Schricker, supra note
112, at 853.
123
See Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetz]
[UrhG] [Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBl. I § 31(4) (F.R.G.); Schricker, supra note
112, at 853–854 (noting in 2004 before the 2007 amendment that “Amazingly, the courts
show a tendency to restrict the range of application of Sec. 31(4).”).
124
See Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetz]
[UrhG] [Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBl. I § 31(4) (F.R.G.); Schricker, supra note
112, at 853; see also Press Release, Bundesministerium der Justiz (German Federal
Ministry of Justice), German Budenstag Adopts Copyright Law Reform (July 5, 2007)
[hereinafter Ministry of Justice Press Release].
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2007 amendment allows copyright owners to grant licenses to use
their works in yet unknown ways.125 However, the permission is
accompanied by a detailed mechanism, under which the user
should notify the author (who is the copyright owner) of the new
intended use.126 The author then has a window of three months to
revoke the right and is entitled to a reasonable remuneration, if the
exploiter uses the work in the formerly unknown manner.127 The
author’s right to withdraw the grant of exploitation rights of the
new uses is also limited and expires upon the death of the
author.128 Third, the employee has some control over subsequent
transfers of the exploitation rights.129 Fourth, the 2002 amendment
allowed the author to renegotiate the terms of the contract if the
compensation is inequitable.130 The amendment lists some
conditions and specifies various standards for such equity.131 The
right is operative if the difference between the reward to the author
and the proceeds is “conspicuous.”132 The right to modify the
contract is limited when a collective labor agreement applies.133
Fifth, the law instructs that the grants of exploitation rights are to
be interpreted narrowly, so whenever in doubt, the disputed uses of

125

See Ministry of Justice Press Release, supra note 124 (explaining that the German
Copyright Act, § 31(4) was stricken out and replaced with new § 31a–31c).
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
See id.
129
Id.; see also Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte
[Urheberrechtsgesetz] [UrhG] [Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBl. I § 34(1) (F.R.G.)
(“An exploitation right may be transferred only with the author’s consent.”). The Act
also limits the power of the author, “The author may not unreasonably refuse his
consent.” Id. § 35 (explaining the grant of non-exclusive exploitation rights by the holder
of an exclusive right).
130
See Schricker, supra note 112, at 854 (explaining how the German Copyright Act, §
32a, enacted in 2002, replaced § 36).
131
See id. at 855.
132
See Karsten M. Gutsche, Equitable Remuneration for Authors in Germany—How
the German Copyright Act Secures Their Rewards, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S. 257,
264–65 (2003) (proposing an escalating royalties’ rates scheme instead of lump-sum
remunerations).
133
Id. at 268. See generally Goldmann, supra note 112. Collective labor agreements
might play an important role in evening the unequal bargaining power of the parties.
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the work remain the author’s.134 Sixth, the law allows agreements
regarding future works, but the author has an unwaiveable right to
terminate the grant after five years.135 Seventh, the employeeauthor has an unwaiveable right of revoking the exploitation right,
in some circumstances.136
The complex German model illustrates that there are
alternatives to the binary allocation rule that attempt to balance the
commercial needs with the authors’ interests. The different
choices reflect the underlying rationales of copyright law and
employment law.
D. Freelancers
Freelancers are independent contractors that remain the owners
of the rights in the works they made, unless they transfer the
rights.137 The common copyright disputes involving freelancers
turn on interpreting the scope of the license granted by the
freelancer, usually a journalist, to the corporate user, usually a
newspaper.138 More concretely, disputes emerge when the contract
mentions a specific use but the commissioning party uses the work
for other uses.139 The question is then whether the new use (e.g.,
online publication) is similar to the agreed upon use (e.g., print
publication).
In Tasini, the defendant newspapers used articles written by
freelance journalists not only according to the original agreed-upon
use, namely in the print newspaper, but also in digital databases
(CDs and online services) of third parties.140 The suit was based
134

Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetz]
[UrhG] [Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBl. I § 37 (F.R.G.). This rule has an exception
in cases of collective works. Id. § 38.
135
Id. § 40.
136
Id. §§ 41, 42 (revocation for non-use and revocation for changed conviction).
137
See discussion supra Part I.C.3.
138
See, e.g., Bourne v. Walt Disney Co., 68 F.3d 621, 631 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that
in cases where only the scope of the license is at issue, the copyright owner bears the
burden of proving that the defendant’s copying was unauthorized).
139
See, e.g., Brown v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 799 F. Supp. 166, 171
(D.D.C. 1992) (noting that prohibition of a specific use does not indicate an intent to
prohibit other uses).
140
N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 498 (2001).
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on § 201(c) of the Copyright Act, which allows the owner of the
copyright in a collective work to reproduce the separate
contributions to the collection, only as part of the collection or as a
revision of the collection.141 The Supreme Court ruled in a 7–2
decision in favor of the journalists, finding that the digital
republication was not a revision of the original collective work and
accordingly, that the publishers were not authorized to use the
articles in the way they did.142 Leaving aside the comparison of
different media and whether this technological/legal interpretation
is correct or not,143 Tasini’s main lesson for our inquiry lies not in
the judicial decision itself, but in the aftermath of the case.
Following the decision, the newspapers changed their
contractual relationship with the freelancer journalists, so that the
latter were required to transfer all possible rights to the newspapers
and in some cases, they were required to do so retroactively.144
Furthermore, the newspapers deleted thousands of articles from

141

17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2006) reads:
Copyright in each separate contribution to a collective work is
distinct from copyright in the collective work as a whole, and vests
initially in the author of the contribution. In the absence of an
express transfer of the copyright or of any rights under it, the owner
of copyright in the collective work is presumed to have acquired only
the privilege of reproducing and distributing the contribution as part
of that particular collective work, any revision of that collective
work, and any later collective work in the same series.
142
Tasini, 533 U.S. at 488. Following the decision, a district court allowed a class
action suit by the freelancers and later approved a settlement of a total of 18 million
dollars. In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig., 509 F.3d 116, 120 (2d
Cir. 2007), cert. granted, Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 129 S. Ct. 1523 (2009).
However, the court of appeals voided the settlement, finding that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to certify a class, which included works that were not registered. See id. at
120–21.
143
See generally Lateef Mtima, Tasini and its Progeny: The New Exclusive Right or
Fair Use on the Electronic Publishing Frontier?, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 369 (2004) (discussing the fate of revisions of collective works, i.e.,
republications of works in a different format, usually a digital format).
144
This new contractual relationship was upheld in Marx v. Globe Newspaper Co., Inc.,
15 Mass. L. Rptr. 400 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2002), where the court found in favor of the
newspaper. The new freelancer agreement read in relevant part that the freelancer grants
the Globe for no additional fee, “a non-exclusive, fully-paid up, worldwide license to use
all of the works that the Globe has previously accepted from [the freelancer], if any.” Id.
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various databases.145 Thus, one of the challenges freelancers face
in the post-Tasini era is how to compensate for their low
bargaining power.146
The case of freelancers highlights the core of the problem,
which is shared by the work-made-for-hire doctrine:147
occasionally a work turns out to have new, previously unforeseen
uses. When neither party expected this happy outcome, the
unforeseen use was not bargained for. The binary legal doctrine
results in a winner take all situation—either the employee owns the
work or the employer does—much to the dismay of the losing
party, who feels that he or she was tricked or that the initial deal
was unfair.148 We shall return to fairness later on.
Parisi and Ševčenko portray the freelancer-publishers
relationship as an anti-commons situation.149 They note that the
easiest solution in the case would have been to compensate the
freelance authors and transfer the digital publication rights to the
publishers.150 However, they point to the asymmetric transaction
costs involved in such a corrective transaction.151 While it is easy
and cheap to split the bundle of rights which constitutes the
copyright, it is expensive to reverse the division and reunify the
fragmented copyrights.152 The high costs are a combination of
tracing all freelance authors affected by the decision, negotiating
with them and overcoming attempts by some freelancers to hold145
See Bickham, supra note 19, at 85–86, 103–04; Gorman & Ginsburg, supra note 21,
at 9 (“In this tug-of-war between author and publisher, the former won the litigation
battle but not necessarily the economic war.”); Terry, supra note 19, at 238; Snyder,
supra note 19, at 365. Landes and Posner describe the decision as unfortunate from an
economic standpoint, since it increases transaction costs without enhancing the incentives
to create. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 273–74 (2003) [hereinafter LANDES & POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE].
146
Interesting options are to unionize or create a collective rights organization. See
Maureen A. O’Rourke, Bargaining in the Shadow of Copyright Law After Tasini, 53
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 605, 626–34 (2003).
147
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
148
See Jacob, supra note 16, at 134.
149
See Parisi & Ševčenko, supra note 21, at 309–10.
150
See id. at 297.
151
Id. at 302–03; see also LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note
145, at 273–74.
152
See Parisi & Ševčenko, supra note 21, at 303.

C02_BIRNHACK_ARTICLE_123009_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

124

12/30/2009 10:47:12 AM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 20:95

out for higher compensation.153 This analysis refers to the
allocation of copyright that takes place after the initial relationship
between the parties has been established, when no pre-assignment
was agreed upon.154
The case of freelance authors highlights some lessons which
can be carried to the employment context. First, we should not
limit our discussion to works that have already been created, but
extend our inquiry to previous points on the timeline. Particularly,
we should notice the pre-employment phase. Second, both
employers and employees adjust their behavior to the law and
continue to do so when the law changes. A legal rule that seems to
empower the weaker party might turn out to be more damaging. In
Coasean terms, this is a corrective transaction.155 The Coase
theorem states that when transaction costs are negligible, the initial
allocation does not matter since the parties will reallocate the
resources at stake.156 Of course, the distribution of wealth among
the parties matters to the parties and in the case of copyright it
might matter to the public at large. In shaping the legal rule of first
allocation, we should hypothesize whether the rule is likely to be
corrected by the market, and if so, would that be a positive
correction. In terms of overall welfare, a corrective transaction is
efficient, but we should explore its distributive effect. In the
aftermath of Tasini, the publishers improved their situation at the
expense of the journalists and the public at large.157
***
Thus far we have considered the multiplicity of modes of
creative production and the changing conditions of the workplace;
replaced the binary option that current law offers with a spectrum
of allocation possibilities and mapped current legal models on this
153
See id. at 311. A possible solution offered by Parisi and Ševčenko turns to the fair
use defense. Id. at 323. More broadly, they suggest that the choice of remedy can solve
Tasini’s anti-commons problem by shifting from a property rule to a liability rule. Id. at
325.
154
See id. at 311.
155
See Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chi., Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1232 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960)).
156
Coase, supra note 27, at 15 (reasoning that in a market with costless transactions,
parties will rearrange their rights to increase the value of production).
157
See supra notes 145–46 and accompanying text.
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spectrum; and reflected upon some lessons from the freelancers’
cases. We can now turn to the theoretical underpinnings of
copyright law to search for guidance.
II. COPYRIGHT LAW: RISKS AND INCENTIVES
Under the economic analysis of copyright law, the rights
accorded to authors serve as incentives to make works of
authorship, which otherwise might not have been made. The
discussion in this part follows this economic logic. Applying this
understanding to the employment context instructs us to search for
the party who bears the risk associated with making the work.158
In most cases, this would be the employer.
Whatever the law’s initial allocation might be, under an
economic analysis the law should enable the parties to contract
around the initial allocation, either ex ante, i.e., before the
employment relationship is established and before the work is
made, or ex post, after the work is made.159 Setting the allocation
as a default rule rather than an inalienable allocation reflects the
importance of facilitating a free market and our commitment to
freedom of contract.160 It also enables the market to correct
inefficient allocations. Accordingly, after searching for the best
risk-bearer (Part II.A), this part inserts Coasean analysis into the
copyright-employment context, arguing that we should
contemplate not only the initial legal allocation, but consider, to
the extent possible, the option that the parties will change the
initial allocation. This discussion leads us to search for the best
default rule (Part II.B). The economic analysis and the interest to
avoid a case-by-case finding, instruct us to identify typical
situations (Part II.C). Accordingly, I suggest that we search for
158

See Jacob, supra note 16, at 124–26. The work-made-for-hire doctrine is interpreted
so to achieve the constitutional goals of copyright law, of providing incentives to create
works and public access to such works. Note that the argument made here need not
contradict Jacob’s argument.
159
See Joshua Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Contract, 58 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1410 (2009) (“Coasean experiments in contract bargains
seek to show that initial allocations of rights do not matter if the parties are able to
contract around those allocations in a cost-free manner.”).
160
Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106, 108 (2002).
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relevant criteria to shape these categories; three such main criteria
are the work, the kind of employer, and the kind of employee.
A. Identifying the Risk-Bearer
1. Copyright Incentives
Under an instrumental conception, copyright law is a means to
an end rather than an end in itself. The goal of copyright law is
described in general terms, such as “the encouragement of
learning” (in the words of the 1709 English Statue of Anne),161 or
“to promote the progress of science” (in the words of the U.S.
Constitution).162 The goal benefits the public, and the right
accorded to the author helps achieve that goal.163 Copyright is
understood as an incentive to the would-be author in that it
prohibits most unlicensed uses of his or her copyrighted work by
others.164
The protection against unlicensed uses is needed due to the
economic features of intangible works as public goods.165 Absent
a law prohibiting the copying of the work, it is likely to be copied
and a market failure is likely to occur.166 The law intervenes so to
restore the functionality of the market, by prohibiting the use of the
work (unless the owner consents to the use), imposing sanctions on
the infringer and providing the owner with a set of remedies. The
law thus creates a legal fence around the intangible work and raises
the costs of copying, which include not only the actual costs of
copying (such as obtaining access and paying for the use of a
photocopy machine) but also the legal risks. The higher cost of
copying affects its feasibility and profitability.

161

Statute of Anne, 1709, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
163
See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
164
See Gordon & Bone, Copyright, supra note 22, at 189; Landes & Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 22, at 326.
165
See Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 22, at
326.
166
See Alan Devlin et al., Success, Dominance, and Interoperability, 84 IND. L.J. 1157,
1173 (2009).
162
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2. Copyright Risks
Thus understood, copyright clears some obstacles and risks
from the author’s path. But copyright does not clear all potential
hurdles and does not guarantee success in the market. It does not
carry any promise to the owners that they will recoup their initial
investment. An author might invest time and effort worth ten
thousand dollars to write a book; a music company might invest a
hundred thousand dollars in producing a CD; a studio might invest
a hundred million dollars in producing a movie. But nevertheless,
all these works might fail in the market. Investment and copyright
protection do not guarantee success.
Copyright law will provide the owner with tools to prevent
others from copying the works without permission.167 The absence
of free copies—assuming enforcement is effective—might
influence the price and the sales. The copyright owner might
charge a higher price and so recover some of the expenses.
Copyright further enables the owner to rely on some distribution
avenues. For example, music producers can rely on online
distribution of the music. This is because the law treats the work
as copyrighted and the copyright provides the rights of distribution
and public performance.168 Thus, self-help mechanisms such as
Digital Rights Management (DRM)169 and para-copyright legal
protections such as the anti-circumvention rules of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)170 ensure that online
distribution is a (legally speaking) safe avenue. Of course,
enforcement has its own costs.
But copyright has nothing to do with the total revenue. The
book might be a best seller, earning millions for the author. The
CD or movie might turn out to be a complete failure in the market.
What does it take to turn a book into a best seller and a movie into
a blockbuster? This is a multi-million dollar question, but the
answer is not found in the realm of copyright. Moreover, copyright
167

17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (enumerating a copyright holder’s exclusive rights).
Id.
169
See generally Stefan Bechtold, Digital Rights Management in the United States and
Europe, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 323 (2004).
170
17 U.S.C. § 1201.
168
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is a necessary tool for some authors and owners, but not for all.
Some dedicate their work to the public domain or allow various
uses of the code they composed or the books they wrote and
nevertheless make money.171 Copyright law is not in itself akin to
winning a lottery ticket; it just assures that no one takes your
ticket.
Thus, marketing cultural products requires two kinds of costs.
First, is the cost of expression, i.e., the costs related to the actual
production, such as time, effort, labor, and payments to other
copyright owners for using their content as raw material. Second
is the cost of producing copies, and marketing and handling the
sales and managing the business, or more generally, the cost of
commercializing the work. This can be rephrased as the costs of
achieving optimal exploitation of the work.172
The risks, accordingly, correspond to two stages in the lifecycle of the work: the creation, and the commercializing.173
Copyright law lowers the risk associated with the first stage by
offering the owner some guarantee that the initial costs will not be
rendered irrelevant by unwanted third parties, but it does not
obliterate the second risk. The author might invest a substantial
amount in making the work and nevertheless might lose the entire
investment without any right being infringed.
3. Shifting Risks in the Workplace
How should the law consider the various costs and risks
described above in devising the rule of initial allocation of
ownership between the employer and the employee? Rephrased in
the incentive theory’s terms, the question is who needs the
incentive? Is it the employee or the employer? The risks
171
See STERLING, supra note 75, at 253. The Open Source GNU/Linux license or
Creative Commons license offers ready mechanisms to allow certain uses in a cheaper
way than individually-tailored licenses.
172
Writing about real property, Posner notes that the law should allocate the resource to
the party who can best use it productively and can incur the costs. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 70, at 81; see also Landes & Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 22, at 326 (defining exploitation of a creative
work).
173
See Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 22, at
326–27.
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associated with making the work in the first place are a strong
proxy for locating the incentives.174 There should be a correlation
between the party who bears the costs and the risks and the
copyright, i.e., the tool that allows the owner to exclude potential
infringers.175 In other words, the risk bearer should enjoy the
copyright, unless we have a strong reason not to allocate the right
to her. Thus, the right should be accorded to the party who
undertakes the costs and the financial risks.176 Had the law
awarded its prize to a party who did not bear the costs and the risks
associated with making the work and commercializing it, it would
not only have failed in its mission to provide incentives for making
the work, but it would have provided disincentives for so doing.177
An initial common sense observation is that the typical riskbearer in the workplace is the employer.178 This is a broad
statement, which will be refined later on. But, beforehand, we
need to point to the advantages of the employer as a risk bearer, as
compared to the employee, and realize that the basic bargain of the
employment relationship between some employers and some
employees is a shift of risks.
Most employers have more resources and familiarity with the
market than their employees.179 The typical employee is risk
averse and relies on his or her salary for a living.180 The employers
(and later I will refine this statement and narrow it to employers in
the content industries) are in the business of marketing their
products. The employer has established marketing avenues. The
employer invested in the commercialization of the work and bears
the commercialization risks.181 The employer has better data than
174

See id. at 327.
See id. at 327–28.
176
Other risks are more difficult to quantify, e.g., a risk to the author’s reputation.
These are addressed by moral rights, to the extent they are recognized by the law.
STERLING, supra note 75, at 279–81. See generally Dietz, supra note 71; Rigamonti,
supra note 71.
177
See Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 22, at
327–28.
178
See Merges, supra note 65, at 16.
179
See Towse, Copyright Policy, supra note 45, at 69.
180
See id.
181
See Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 22, at
327.
175
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the employee about market behavior and has better experience
with the market.182 Employees, especially those whose livelihood
depends upon making works of authorship, are less familiar with
the market; they work in the creative department rather than in the
marketing division. Furthermore, employers (and once again,
especially those in the content industry) produce and/or market
many works and thus can cross-subsidize between them by pooling
the risks together and thereby diluting each separate risk. 183 It
might be that nine out of ten books will fail in the market, but the
tenth book will be a best seller, the sales of which will easily cover
the costs of the nine books. A publisher who owns all ten books
can dilute the risk in each book, whereas an employee, had she
owned only the copyright to her book, would be unable to do so.
Hence, the author (whether employee or not) is likely to transfer
the rights to the publisher (whether employer or not).
The problem, once again, is that when that single book turns to
be a best seller, then in hindsight, the pre-assignment of the rights
seems unfair. Perhaps, one might argue, in such happy occasions,
the author should be compensated. A response is found in an
argument advanced by Landes and Posner, in their influential
article, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, where they
treated the author and publisher (though not in the employment
context) as one unit without observing their sometimes conflicting
interests, other than a short indirect comment.184 Addressing the
author-publisher relationship, they noted: “A publisher (say) who
must share any future speculative gains with the author will pay
the author less for the work, so the risky component of the author’s
expected remuneration will increase relative to the certain
component.”185 In a later work, Landes and Posner addressed the
work-made-for-hire doctrine directly, arguing, inter alia, that
paying wages shifts the risk from the employee to the employer.186

182
183
184
185
186

See Towse, Copyright Policy, supra note 45, at 69.
See id.
Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 22, at 327.
Id.
LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 145, at 272.
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A similar point was made by Robert Merges in the context of
ownership of employee inventions.187 He noted that the law
enables pre-assignment contracts between the employers and the
employees, transferring the rights ex ante.188 Merges explained the
pre-assignment contract as a trade of risks: “[I]t is arguable that
current salaries for R&D employees are a precise measure of the
expected, risk-adjusted present value of all future employee
inventions.”189 He further points to various internal incentives,
such as employee reward plans and to a “simple risk analysis.”190
Merges referred to the employee’s consent to a low-risk award in
the form of a salary, where the employer undertakes the risk and
investment associated with the patenting and further development
of the invention.191
To summarize, the employer is better situated than the
employee to market the work more efficiently and bears most of
the costs associated with marketing it.
The employment
relationships can be viewed as a shift of risks from the employee to
the employer. The question, then, is should the law imitate this
typical behavior and allocate the initial ownership to the employer?
B. A Coasean Analysis and Penalty Default Rules
In a legal environment that celebrates the freedom to contract
and aims to facilitate a functioning free market, one might ask
187

See generally Merges, supra note 65. Merges integrates patent law and employment
law, via a careful understanding of the complex context of the workplace. See id. He
supports the current default rules set by patent law, according to which the employer is
the owner of the patent. In comparing copyright law to patent law, one should be aware
of the differences between the two fields, however. For these differences, see id.
188
Merges, supra note 65, at 8–9. Merges also explains how the pre-assignment
contracts preempt the anti-commons problem and the need to gather dispersed property
rights ex post. Id. at 4, 54. Thus, the invention exploiters can avoid the asymmetric
transactions costs.
189
Id. at 16. Merges also discusses team production theory, which points to the
difficulty in determining the individual contribution of each employee to the final
product. Id. at 20–23. This point is acute in the patent field and is equally applicable to
some modes of creative production in the copyright field, such as in large content
industries like software companies, Hollywood studios, research institutes issuing public
reports or law firms composing a legal document.
190
Id. at 30–31.
191
Id. at 31.
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whether the initial allocation matters at all, given the parties’
ability to contract around it. An initial allocation which can be
changed by the parties means that the allocation is only a default
rule.192 However, changing a default requires information,
awareness and understanding of the situation and the ability to
evaluate it.193 Phrased in the economic terms offered by Ronald
Coase, the question is about the likelihood of a corrective
transaction.194 Coase famously pointed to transaction costs as a
factor that might fail corrective transactions.195 Accordingly,
where transaction costs are not negligible or when there are other
reasons for which a corrective transaction is unlikely to occur, the
initial allocation does matter.
Hence, the question is what should be the default rule of initial
allocation? Transaction costs might mean that the initial allocation
is likely to stay. From an efficiency point of view, we should
search for a rule that maximizes efficiency.196 According to one
view, the default rule should imitate the parties’ anticipated
behavior and thus save negotiation costs.197 The rule should be
designed according to what the parties would have agreed upon.198
A second view would opt for the opposite, counter-intuitive default
rule. This is the penalty default rule.199
Discussing contract law, Ayers and Gertner suggested that in
some situations the default rule should not imitate the parties’
anticipated negotiations and be exactly opposite thereto.200 Such
rules are appropriate when there are information asymmetries
between the parties.201 The default rule should favor the less-

192

Ayers & Gertner, supra note 28, at 91.
Id. at 97.
194
See Coase, supra note 27, at 15.
195
Id.
196
Ayers & Gertner, supra note 28, at 97; see also Sunstein, supra note 160, at 123–25.
197
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 15 (1991).
198
Id. (writing, in the context of corporate law, that “corporate law should contain terms
people would have negotiated, were the costs of negotiating at arm’s length for every
contingency sufficiently low”).
199
Ayers & Gertner, supra note 28, at 97.
200
See id. at 91.
201
See id. at 97–99.
193
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informed party.202 Thus, if the better informed party wishes to flip
the default rule, it would have to raise the issue during
negotiations.203 The result is that the information would be
revealed and known to both parties.204 The penalty default rule
thus serves as an informing mechanism.205 Ayers and Gertner
explained: “Penalty defaults, by definition, give at least one party
to the contract an incentive to contract around the default. From an
efficiency perspective, penalty default rules can be justified as a
way to encourage the production of information.”206
Applying the analysis of the Coase theorem and of default rules
to the employment context indicates that the chances of a
corrective transaction are asymmetric: employers are more likely
to change the initial allocation in their favor and employees are
less likely to be able to do so.207 Thus, although the penalty
default rule might serve its informative function, this would be of
no avail to employees. If the default rule awards the employee the
initial ownership, the employer would insist that the allocation be
changed. Given the superior power of the employer over the
employee in a market where there is competition among the
employees over jobs, the default rule would be flipped. Changing
the default rule would raise awareness, but the employee would be
unable to sustain the allocation in her favor or extract any other
benefits. If the default rule were the opposite, awarding initial
ownership to the employer, it would be more likely to stay that
way.208 Further, in a market where there is competition among
employers over employees, the latter’s bargaining power might
suffice to protect their rights and interests.209

202

Id. at 98.
See id. at 97–100.
204
See id.
205
See id.
206
Id. at 97.
207
For a similar argument, see LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra
note 145, at 272 (arguing that an allocation to the employee would result in a transfer of
the rights to the employer). See also LIONEL BENTLY & BRAD SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 123 (2d ed. 2004).
208
See BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 207, at 123.
209
See Sunstein, supra note 160, at 125–27.
203
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A 1988 law review article by Professor Hardy provides an
elaborate economic analysis of copyright in the workplace and
serves as a convenient baseline for the discussion here.210
Interestingly, Hardy assumed that the work-made-for-hire doctrine
does not raise particular difficulties with salaried employees and
thus focused on freelancers and independent contractors and more
specifically on the ownership of unforeseen and unbargained for
uses of the copyrighted work.211 Applying the Coase theorem,
Hardy noted that in the regular course of events, authors and
publishers negotiate all the time and hence the transaction costs are
low.212 He concluded that the initial allocation in these cases does
not matter from the public’s point of view.213 Focusing on the
unforeseen uses, he concluded that bargaining over the rights for
such uses have infinite transaction costs.214 Hardy then explored
two possible criteria for allocating the rights of these uses. One is
the “best exploiter” test: it examines which party is in a better
position to exploit the work, in terms of resources, experience, and
market position.215 He evaluated “better exploitation” according to
what can be understood as a constitutional standard that the works
should benefit the public, rather than the copyright owner (or
author).216
A second possible criterion Hardy discussed is the “cheaper
estimator”: “who is better placed to estimate the value of
unforeseen uses”?217 If we accord the rights to this party, it alone
would profit from the unforeseen uses.218 If we accord the rights
in the unforeseen uses to the party who could not estimate them
cheaply, the rule would result in the cheaper estimator raising the

210

See generally Hardy, supra note 23.
See id. at 190–92.
212
Id. at 191.
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
Id. at 192.
216
See id. Hardy emphasized the public, but did not directly attribute this emphasis to
the Constitution. His careful study of numerous cases found that courts followed this
“better exploiter” rule in most cases. See id. at 199–202.
217
Id. at 192–93. Note that Hardy assumes that known uses are disclosed. Id. at 191
n.23.
218
Id. at 192.
211
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issue during negotiations and contracting for any such uses.219
Accordingly, Hardy concluded that the rights for any unforeseen
uses should vest with the party who cannot estimate the unforeseen
uses cheaply.220 Rephrased in terms offered later by Ayers and
Gertner, Hardy took into account the asymmetric power and
searched for a mechanism that would solve the information gap.221
The “cheaper estimator” test can be rephrased as a penalty default
rule, which forces the more sophisticated party to reveal its
estimations.222 But Hardy then backed off, noting that this is a
difficult assessment to make and should be done on a case-by-case
analysis.223 He thus abandoned this criterion and remained with
the best exploiter criterion alone.224
This is a very helpful analysis, but we need to draw its
contours. It limits itself to situations where there is no contract, or
that the contract is silent about some uses of the work, as in the
case of unforeseen uses. Foreseeing the unforeseen is indeed an
impossible task, but as Ruth Towse notes, publishers frequently
require the author to assign all future rights, including unknown
uses.225 The publishers simply have more experience and have
realized more than once that unforeseen uses do occur.226 The
digitization of every kind of work, which characterized the 1990s,
provides one example,227 and broadcasting video over mobile
phones in the 2000s is another.228 In other words, the fact that
there are unforeseen uses is itself foreseen and can be addressed by
the parties ex ante.229 Thus, the experienced publisher (or
219

See id.
Id. at 195.
221
See id. at 192–95.
222
See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 28, at 91.
223
Hardy, supra note 23, at 194.
224
Id. at 195.
225
RUTH TOWSE, CREATIVITY, INCENTIVE AND REWARDS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
COPYRIGHT AND CULTURE IN THE INFORMATION AGE 17 (2001) [hereinafter TOWSE,
CREATIVITY, INCENTIVE AND REWARDS].
226
See id.
227
BENKLER, supra note 36, at 214–15.
228
Id. at 404–05.
229
Unless the law interferes and prohibits transactions as to future works or future uses,
as did the German Copyright Act until the 2007 amendment. See supra text
accompanying note 123.
220
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employer), who is usually the cheaper estimator, is likely to raise
the issue of unforeseen uses during negotiations with the author
(employee).230 Given the unknown probability of such unforeseen
uses and their inherent speculative nature, the price the author
might ask for is likely to be low, if anything.
Cognitive psychology teaches us that many prefer the concrete,
solid and positive present value, rather than the probable future
gain with similar expectancy.231 In the context of creative
employees, the future gains and their probability are unknown in
advance.232 Faced with the option of receiving a reasonable
payment now or a large share of the gains in the future, but under
an assumption of low probability, most people would prefer the
former option.233 Adding that we can safely assume that most
employees are risk-averse and that most employers can more easily
bear the risk by spreading it over their entire activity, and taking
into consideration that sharing the gains with the authors is likely
to reduce the authors’ salary and shift back part of the risk to
them,234 the practice of requiring that all rights are transferred is
more efficient and Hardy’s “cheapest estimator” rule collapses.
Given the unequal bargaining power of the employee and the
employer, we should not be surprised to see that where a written

230

See Hardy, supra note 23, at 193–95.
See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Craig R. Fox, Weighing Risk and Uncertainty, in
PREFERENCES, BELIEF AND SIMILARITY: SELECTED WRITINGS 747 (Amos Tversky & Eldar
Shafir eds., 2003). There are two preferences: one for the certain rather than the probable
and one for the present rather than the future. Id. For example, most of us would rather
receive $100 than a 20% chance that we would receive $500. Further, most of us would
rather receive it now than later. Id. When the present offer is concrete and certain and the
future offer is uncertain, it is an easy choice, unless the expected benefit (the probability
of profits) in the latter case is much higher than the current offer. Id.
232
See TOWSE, CREATIVITY, INCENTIVE AND REWARDS, supra note 225, at 69–71.
233
See discussion of the “certainty effect” and related effects in Paul Slovic, Baruch
Fischoff & Sara Lichtenstein, Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 463, 480–81 (Daniel
Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, in PREFERENCES, BELIEF AND
SIMILARITY: SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 231, at 551, 606–11.
234
See LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 145, at 272.
231
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contract exists, the employee will transfer all uses, known and
present as well as unknown and future, to the employer.235
This analysis instructs us that in some cases, even where there
are information asymmetries, a penalty default rule would not be
effective. Indeed, it might draw the attention of the uninformed
employee, who will now be informed. However, information in
itself is insufficient to be able to change the default rule.236 In an
employee’s market, i.e., where there is competition among
employees over jobs, the average employee is unable to shift the
default rule in his or her favor.237 The result of a penalty default
rule would be that it would easily be contracted around without a
penalty to the employer.238 Moreover, the employee would suffer
demoralization costs. Learning about a right one has, only to
realize that it is easily taken away without any ability to affect the
transfer or without any compensation, might cause loss of trust.
Such an employee might feel he or she was tricked. The
demoralization costs of an easily-contracted-around penalty default
rule (or better: a non-penalty default rule) can be rephrased as an
endowment effect, i.e., the bias of property holders as to its
value.239 Owners tend to value their property at a higher price than
they themselves would have been willing to pay to buy the same
property.240 If the default rule accords the employee with the
copyright subject to the option to change the default rule, and
given the typical lack of power by the individual employee, the

235
Once again, the aftermath of Tasini, where newspapers insisted that freelancers
agree to an “all rights transferred” contract with no further compensation, illustrates this
point. See supra notes 144–45 and accompanying text. Hardy’s analysis is also limited in
that he focused on works that have already been made. See generally Hardy, supra note
23. He assumed that the works came into being and discussed the post-creation phase. Id.
Hence, it is not surprising that his main criterion is the better exploiter of the work. Id. at
195. However, the economic view of copyright law taught us that the law needs to
provide incentives to make works in the first place. We should query how considering
the ex ante incentives affect his analysis.
236
See Sunstein, supra note 160, at 120–22.
237
Id. at 107.
238
Id. at 119–20.
239
Id. at 112 (discussing the endowment effect in the context of employment).
240
Id.
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allocation would be changed and the employee would feel the
greater loss caused by the endowment effect.241
This kind of cost does not in itself dictate that the law avoids
such allocations. Such a conclusion would amount to endorsing
some form of imposed ignorance, which I do not support. The
argument is that there is no point in devising rules that will fail to
achieve their stated purpose, and in addition, cause unnecessary
demoralization. Thus, a penalty default rule awarding initial
ownership to the employee would have the unnecessary costs of
the corrective transactions and additional demoralization costs.242
The information deficiencies should be taken care of, but not by a
penalty default rule.243
The interim conclusion is that allocating the initial rights to the
employee is likely to be corrected immediately by the employer at
almost no cost, but a contrary allocation is likely to stay. The
author/employee is compensated by receiving a steady salary and
ridding herself from the risks associated with making and
commercializing the work, as well as enforcing the rights.244 This
conclusion will be subject to an inspection under employment law,
but beforehand, we need to fine-tune the general statement made
earlier, that the employer is the best risk-bearer.245
C. Typical Cases
A general rule based on typical cases is more efficient than a
case-by-case rule as it enhances foreseeability, but given that there
are various kinds of transaction costs that might fail efficient
corrective transactions, I believe it is better to calibrate the scales
and zoom-in into the workplace, in order to differentiate between
various kinds of situations. This will enable us to fine-tune the
general allocation rule.246 Accordingly, we should ask the
following question: in the workplace, who is the party that
241

See id. at 126.
Id. at 126–27.
243
See infra Part III.C.
244
Merges, supra note 65, at 16.
245
Id.
246
Of course, defining sub-categories has some costs of its own, as parties are likely to
disagree as to the applicable category, a dispute resulting in uncertainty and further costs.
242
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typically undertakes the risks associated with creating the
copyrighted work?
Three criteria lend themselves to this
discussion: the kind of work, the kind of employer, and the kind of
employee. I discuss them briefly and then turn to the scope
element of the work-made-for-hire doctrine to evaluate it on the
background of this discussion.
1. The Work
Some products require pooling together several works of
different authors. A movie combines a literary work (the script),
musical works, photography, acting, directing, and many other
works. Landes and Posner noted that it is efficient to vest
copyright of an integrated expressive work in the hands of one
person so to avoid multiple ownerships.247 Parisi and Ševčenko
elaborated on this point and argued that creative works are often
the result of many people each contributing a piece of the work,
which needs to be assembled together.248 Complex software is an
example. In order to be able to commercialize the aggregated
work, the bits and bytes need to be accumulated. The various
authors can attempt to negotiate a joint venture, but given the wellknown problems of common action such as negotiation costs and
hold-outs, the split of rights is likely to result in an anti-commons
problem and nothing at all but frustration.249 Allocating the rights
to one entity in the first place is far more efficient than pooling
them together later.250 Thus, in the case of integrated expressive

247
LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 145, at 272. For the
perils of multiple ownerships, see generally Heller, supra note 62.
248
Parisi & Ševčenko, supra note 21, at 303; see also Merges, supra note 65, at 20–23
(discussing “team production theory” in the context of patent law).
249
See Heller, supra note 62, at 677–78. A shared ideology can provide a powerful
motivation to overcome the common-action problem. For example, the Open Source
movement provides numerous illustrations of joint ventures, where those who participate
forego any veto rights they might have had, thus mitigating the anti-commons problem.
For a discussion of the process in which open source software is achieved, see R. VAN
WENDEL DE JOODE ET AL., PROTECTING THE VIRTUAL COMMONS—SELF ORGANIZING
OPEN SOURCE AND FREE SOFTWARE COMMUNITIES AND INNOVATIVE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY REGIMES 13–23 (2003) (describing models of open source and the way to
coordinate distributed ownership).
250
Parisi & Ševčenko, supra note 21, at 303.
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works, to use Landes and Posner’s term,251 there is yet another
reason to allocate the rights to the employer.
2. The Employer
The employer’s business model matters.
We should
differentiate a content business from a non-content business. In
workplaces such as a music label, a Hollywood studio, a software
company or a publishing house, the employer is in a better position
to undertake the risks associated with producing and
commercializing the work, since the typical production firm does
not invest in one work only, but simultaneously, in several
works.252 This enables an employer to spread the risk over the
several works and cross-subsidize them. The employer whose
incentive is to market such works has better familiarity with the
market and its workings. Thus, the employer is in a better position
to market the work efficiently and successfully.
In a non-content industry, where the employee is hired to do a
non-creative (in the copyright sense) job, but nevertheless makes a
work of authorship, the employer is not usually involved in the risk
taken in making the work, nor does the employer have unique
knowledge about the market of the unexpected work.253 In such
cases, there is no ex ante reason to allocate the copyright to the
employer.
3. The Employee
As the previous criterion illustrates, some employees are hired
to make a creative work, such as an architect hired to work in an
architecture firm, a doll designer, or a musician hired to compose
music for an advertising firm. Some employees are not hired to
make creative works, whether they work for a content industry or
not: a secretary, a laboratory supervisor, or a recruitment officer.
These employees might nevertheless make works of authorship,
251

LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 145, at 272.
Dreyfuss, Commodifying Collaborative Research, supra note 26, at 404–05 (noting
that the film industry played a significant role in the creation of the work-for-hire
doctrine).
253
See, e.g., Miller v. CP Chems. Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1238 (D.S.C. 1992).
252

C02_BIRNHACK_ARTICLE_123009_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2009]

WHO OWNS BRATZ?

12/30/2009 10:47:12 AM

141

perhaps to the pleasant surprise of all. In some cases, these works
might turn out to be profitable. A lecture prepared by an employee
can be published and sold to a publisher, a guide written for
internal purposes can turn out to be useful to other firms, software
written to improve office work might be commercialized. In such
cases, we are unlikely to find pre-assignment contracts, and neither
side is especially suited to market the work, so it is unclear ex ante
who is the best risk-bearer. Given that the work was created after
the commencement of the employment relationship, the likelihood
of a corrective transaction is minimized.254 The parties might
decide to engage in a joint venture and will then formalize their
relationship regarding the work.255
4. The Scope of Employment
Under the second element of the work-made-for-hire doctrine,
a court (or the parties themselves) should decide whether the work
was made within the scope of employment.256 Recall that courts
apply a three part test borrowed from agency law, examining
whether the work is “of the kind [the employee] was employed to
perform,” whether the work was made “within the authorized time
and space limits,” and whether it was made with the purpose that it
serves the employer’s interests.257
The first test (kind of work) requires that we ask the question
just proposed: what was the employee hired to do? Assessing
whether the employee was hired to make creative works requires
that we interpret the employment contract, whether written or oral,
and take into account the dynamic nature of such contracts.258
The second test (time and space) is rather objective, but is
irrelevant to many new forms of employment,259 and in any case,
254

See supra Part II.B.
See Dreyfuss, Commodifying Collaborative Research, supra note 26, at 407–10.
256
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); see, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490
U.S. 730, 739–40 (1989).
257
Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 571 (4th Cir. 1994); see also Avtec Sys.,
Inc. v. Peiffer, No. 94-2364, 1995 WL 541610, at *4 (4th Cir. Sept. 13, 1995).
258
Guy Mundlak, Generic or Sui-Generis Law of Employment Contracts?, 16 INT’L J.
COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 309, 319 (2000).
259
Kreiss, supra note 96, at 129. Thus, for example, a court found that a research
fellow works either in the employer’s institution or elsewhere, e.g., in the library. See
255
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can be easily bypassed by an employee who wishes to distance the
employer from the (later to be disputed) work.260 In a world of
changing working conditions, with ubiquitous computing and
universal communication access, the physical place and the time of
the making of the work are obsolete factors.261 Whether the work
was created during the duration of employment remains relevant,
but is more of an indicator as to the first element of the workmade-for-hire doctrine, i.e., whether the author was an employee at
all.
The third test (purpose) is difficult to evaluate and would often
require evidence and testimonies, thus rendering it unpredictable in
many cases and expensive (and risky) to find out.262 Some courts
seem to transform the rather subjective inquiry of the employee’s
purpose to a more objective inquiry about the connection between
the work and the employment.263 To the extent that this test is so
interpreted, it is no more than another facet of the first test: while
the first test compares the general tasks of the employee and his or
her actual activity in making the disputed work, the third test asks
about the fit between the employer’s activity and the specific
work.264
Following the analysis offered here, the better question should
be the following: which party undertook, or is better situated to
undertake, the risks associated with making the work and
commercializing it? The first test, asking whether the employee
was hired to make creative works like the work at stake, is thus the
most important of the three agency tests, while the second should

Genzmer v. Pub. Health Trust of Miami-Dade County, 219 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1282 (S.D.
Fla. 2002). A more decisive factor was that the work at stake in that dispute—a computer
program—was made while the research fellow was an employee. Id. at 1282.
260
Kreiss, supra note 96, at 129.
261
See Genzmer, F. Supp. 2d at 1281–82.
262
Indeed, courts seem to struggle with this test. See Avtec, 1995 WL 541610, at *5.
Kreiss pointed to the subjective nature of the third test. Kreiss, supra note 96, at 129.
263
See, e.g., Miller v. CP Chems. Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1238, 1244 (D.S.C. 1992) (“[The]
ultimate purpose of the development of the [work] was to benefit [employer] by
maximizing the efficiency of the operation of the quality control lab.”).
264
Kreiss, supra note 96, at 129 (proposing that when the first two tests are met, there
is a presumption that the employee acted by a desire to serve the employer).
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no longer be an indication for this purpose, and the third is at most,
an indication of the first test.
Miller v. CP Chemicals, Inc.265 provides a helpful
illustration.266 As mentioned above, Miller, a former employee,
argued that he owned the copyright in a computer program he
developed while employed at CP Chemicals.267 Miller was the
laboratory’s supervisor, a job that included computerization of
analytical data generated in the lab.268 Miller became concerned
about the efficiency of manual calculations in the quality control of
one of the products.269 He then wrote a computer program to assist
in the matter.270 The development was done at home on his own
time without further payment.271 CP managers knew about the
program and requested Miller to write further programs for other
products, which he did.272 After the employment was terminated,
the parties disputed the ownership of the first program.273
Following Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid
(CCNV),274 the court applied agency tests to determine the scope of
Miller’s employment.275 On the first test, the court found that “the
development of the computer program was at least incidental to his
job responsibilities,” despite the fact the job description did not
mention computer programming.276 On the second test, the court
found that the work was done during the time period of
employment, though from the home, on Miller’s time and with no
additional pay.277 The third test was decisive. The court found a
fit between the disputed work (the computer program) and the

265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277

808 F. Supp. 1238 (D.S.C. 1992).
See also King v. SA Weather Service 2008 (143) SCA (S. Afr.).
Miller, 808 F. Supp. at 1239.
Id. at 1240.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1240–41.
490 U.S. 730 (1989).
Miller, 808 F. Supp. at 1243.
Id.
Id.
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employer’s interests, in that it was “directly related to a specific
product . . . for the primary benefit of the employer.”278
This reasoning fails to take into account both copyright law and
employment law perspectives. The risk that the time and effort
invested in the making of the work might turn out to be a waste,
was borne solely by the employee. Had the program not
succeeded, Miller would have borne the costs. The costs and the
risks at stake are those associated with the making of the work and
with utilizing it. The fact that the work was product-specific and
hence less likely to be commercialized is less relevant. Consider,
for example, an independent contractor who approaches a firm,
saying that she has studied its business and thinks it can improve
its production by applying a device (or software) she designed for
its particular use. The risk is borne only by her: if she fails to sell,
she will be left with a useless product. In other words, the Miller
court made too much of the fit between the software and the
employer’s business. The focus should have remained on the fit
between the job description, interpreted in a pro-employee manner
as discussed in the next part, and the actual work done, asking
about the location and placement of the risks.279 Awarding the
copyright to the employer in this context lessens the incentives of
the employees to think outside the box, initiate new tools and
develop software that benefits all.
***
To summarize, under a copyright law perspective, the initial
allocation of copyright should correspond to the risks taken in
producing the work in the first place and in commercializing it
later on.280 In designing allocation rules, the legislature or the
courts should consider the uneven chances of a corrective
transaction. The typical situation is that the employer is the best
risk-bearer.281 Nevertheless, instead of one scenario, the law
278

Id. at 1244 n.7.
The court was aware that a contract could have solved the uncertainty, but failed to
take into account the unequal bargaining power of the employee vis-à-vis the employer.
The court admitted that the work-made-for-hire doctrine might create harsh results, but
placed the burden on the employee to obtain a written agreement. Id. at 1245.
280
See discussion supra Part II.A.
281
See discussion supra Part II.A.
279
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should address several typical situations and shape legal categories
accordingly. The kind of work, the business model of the
employer, and the kind of employee are all factors to be
considered.282 A penalty default rule may convey information but
it will be ineffective and cause other unnecessary costs.283 The
information gaps should be addressed in a different manner.
This analysis supports the second element in the work-madefor-hire doctrine, i.e., whether the work was created within the
scope of the employment, with a proposal to interpret it with an
emphasis on the question of risk, instead of the current three-prong
test borrowed from agency law.284 A second leg of the allocation
rule looks not only at the work at stake and the risk bearer, but at
the relationship between the parties, and this is where employment
law enters.
III. EMPLOYMENT LAW
Thus far, we have discussed the question of ownership of
works created by employees from a copyright law perspective
under its economic conception. Courts supplement copyright law
with tests borrowed from agency law, which in turn derives from
tort law.285 Relationships between a hiring party and a hired party,
whether employees or not, might also be subject to principles of
contract law.286 The absence of employment law within this legal
construction is striking. This part suggests that we insert and
integrate principles of employment law into the copyright law
analysis. The integration is important in the particular case but it
also serves a broader argument, that copyright law should not be
isolated from other legal fields.
This part first presents the dilemma arising from the legal
setting and briefly draws the contours of the discussion by
explaining the methodology undertaken here (Part III.A). Second,
282

See discussion supra Part II.C.
See discussion supra Part II.B.
284
See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.
285
See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740–41 (1989). See
generally Jacob, supra note 16.
286
See Burnham, supra note 63, at 400; Mundlak, supra note 258, at 319.
283
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this part unpacks the notion of unfairness in the employment
context (Part III.B) and then discusses concrete legal mechanisms
that correspond to the unpacked meaning of fairness (Part III.C).
A. Setting the Stage
1. Fairness and Efficiency
Instincts of justice (and more often, of injustice) often tilt us
towards the weaker party in a legal conflict. We wish to assist the
poor in their struggle with the rich or the citizen struggling to find
his way through the corridors of the bureaucratic state. We wish to
lend a supporting hand to the person in need. However, while
these are just instincts, they are perhaps not shared by all. Instincts
are a good reason to question and revisit current norms, deliberate
and think of improvements to the existing order, but they are
insufficient grounds in themselves for legal reasoning. Instincts
cannot substitute rational logic, though the latter can and should
reflect considerations of justice, even of compassion. The question
of initial ownership reflects a tension between instincts of justice
or fairness and efficiency.287 This is not to say that efficiency is by
nature unjust, or that justice and fairness are by nature inefficient.
However, in the context of the discussion here, the efficient
solution in many cases is to award ownership to the employer, an
allocation which at first sight might not seem fair to many
observers. Here, I try to breakdown this intuitive dichotomy, show
its complexity and fine-tune the legal rules accordingly.
The unfairness instincts play an active role in both the
popular288 and legislative forums.289 These instincts arise when the
employer earns much from a work made by the employee while

287

See Guy Davidov, The (Changing?) Idea of Labour Law, 146 INT’L LAB. REV. 311,
313–14 (2007) [hereinafter Davidov, The (Changing?) Idea of Labour Law].
288
See, e.g., Courtney Love, Remarks at the Digital Hollywood Online Entertainment
Conference (June 14, 2000), available at http://archive.salon.com/tech/feature/2000/
06/14/love/ (criticizing the record industry’s pressure to include sound recordings in the
“work for hire” doctrine in the U.S.).
289
See, e.g., Hardy, supra note 23, at 183–85 (discussing testimonies before Congress
while it debated the 1976 Copyright Act).
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the employee does not share the gains.290 Bluntly speaking, the
(un)fairness instinct is that the employer rips off the weak
employee’s creative works and the revenues. It is especially acute
in situations where there are “unbargained for or unforeseen uses,
[in which] one party will gain what the other loses,”291 i.e., when
“unforeseen uses . . . bring windfall profits to the hiring party,”292
or put differently, “an ex ante ‘fair’ bargain can turn into an ex post
rip-off.”293 The complaint about unfairness can be read as a
merger of two narratives—that of the romantic author prevalent in
copyright law294 with that of the exploited, weak employee, in
employment law.295 Of course, “weak” and “powerful” are
relative and fuzzy terms. Is the employee so weak vis-à-vis the
employer? Is the unfairness instinct valid? If so, how should the
law account for it?
The tension appears in the legal layer of the allocation
spectrum, discussed above.296 The American model seems at first
sight to prefer efficiency to fairness,297 whereas the German model
seems at first sight to focus almost entirely on the author and prefer
fairness to efficiency.298
While the tension between
justice/fairness instincts and efficiency surfaces within each model,
the focus here is on the American model. Both elements of the
work-made-for-hire doctrine reflect the conflict between efficiency
and fairness. A broad interpretation of the scope element, i.e., a
low threshold that easily recognizes works as made within the
scope of employment, supports the employers, whereas a narrower
interpretation would support the employees. Part II addressed the
290
See Davidov, The (Changing?) Idea of Labour Law, supra note 287, at 312 (“The
right of the employer to issue commands and make unilateral decisions with regard to the
workplace confers significant powers, which can sometimes be abused.”).
291
See Hardy, supra note 23, at 185.
292
Id. at 190.
293
TOWSE, CREATIVITY, INCENTIVE AND REWARDS, supra note 225, at 17 (emphasis
added).
294
See Jaszi, supra note 41, at 456; Woodmansee, supra note 41, at 425. Others doubt
the influence of the romantic author on the law. See Mark A. Lemley, Romantic
Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873, 882–88 (1997).
295
See Davidov, The (Changing?) Idea of Labour Law, supra note 287, at 312.
296
See discussion supra Part I.B.
297
See supra Part I.C.1.
298
See discussion supra Part I.C.4.
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efficiency side in this tension. Now we need to unpack the
“fairness” part of this juxtaposition. Beforehand, a short
methodological comment is due.
2. Methodology
Studying the intersection of two separate legal fields can be
conducted in several ways. One is doctrinal and searches for a
rather technical way to coordinate between the two bodies of law
so to minimize friction in their application. A second, deeper level
of inquiry, asks whether the two fields are compatible, by turning
to the underlying theories of each. The second track requires that
we first explore each field of law separately and then examine the
match of the principles, rather than examining the rules which are
supposed to execute the principles.299 The theoretical inquiry is
complicated when each body of law has several underlying
theories, which might not be in harmony.
Several theories explain copyright law, ranging from an
instrumental conception under which copyright is a means to serve
the public,300 to a competing conception, which views copyright as
a means to serve the authors’ proprietary rights.301 Employment
law as well can be read under several views, emphasizing equity
(fairness) or efficiency and various attempts to reconcile the
two.302 Thus, in examining the relationship between copyright law
and employment law, we can either map all possible theories of
each field of law and inquire all possible pairs of the theories’
interrelationships, or, choose in advance our preferable theory of
each field. Here I undertake the latter approach and juxtapose
copyright law under its economic theory, with employment law,
under its fairness conception.
299
For an application of the second, theoretical track, in the context of the relationship
between copyright law and free speech jurisprudence, see Michael D. Birnhack, More or
Better? Shaping the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN—
IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW 59, 85 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt
Hugenholtz eds., 2006).
300
See STERLING, supra note 75, at 58.
301
For theories of copyright law, see Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual
Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31, 38 (1989); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of
Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 296 (1988).
302
See Davidov, The (Changing?) Idea of Labour Law, supra note 287, at 313–14.
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This pair of rival principles chosen for examination is probably
the most intriguing one, as the principles on the table are efficiency
and fairness. In this sense, I believe the gap between copyright law
and employment law is much wider than had we examined
copyright law under a non-utilitarian, droit d’auteur view and
compared it with employment law, with a fairness-reading in mind.
The latter view informs German law, discussed above, which
strives to protect the individual author/employee more than the
hiring party.303 Equally, had we examined copyright law under a
strict economic reading and treated the employment relationship as
a labor market, similar to other free markets, there would not be
much of a conflict (and authors/employees would not fare very
well).
B. Fairness in Employment
This section unpacks the meaning of fairness in the context of
an employee’s copyrighted works. The discussion identifies
information deficiencies and external factors as causes of
unfairness, but then examines the employment relationship as a
shift of risks.
1. Fairness
Fairness is a moral principle that in itself does not say much.
Often, fairness is an ex post conclusion or observation, but does
not include ex ante guidance. In order to render this principle
helpful, we need to unpack the meaning of fairness in the
employment context, a rather daunting task. I will narrow down
the task to ownership in works made in the workplace context.
What does fairness mean in the context of employment law?
The crux of the fairness argument is a well-known lesson of
employment law, that the employer and the employee have
unequal bargaining power.304 The employee is often much weaker
303

See discussion supra Part I.C.4.
Davidov, The Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, supra note 30, at 138;
see Hugh Collins, Justifications and Techniques of Legal Regulation of the Employment
Relation, in LEGAL REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION 3, 10–11 (Hugh Collins,
Paul Davies & Roger Rideout eds., 2000).
304
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than the employer.305 Absent legal rules or social norms to limit
the employer’s power, the employer could exploit the employee
and mistreat him or her. The ultimate power to fire the employee
would loom in the background of the employment relationship but
at the forefront of the employee’s concerns.
However, much like “fairness,” unequal bargaining power is a
description of a particular employment context or even of general
modes of employment, but it is not instructive in itself.306 Finding
that there is unequal bargaining power is too general an
observation and only directs us to search for ways to correct the
inequality. Hence, this much-used term, too, needs to be
unpacked. Of course, some argue that there is no inherent
unfairness in the employment context and that it is just a matter of
demand and supply.307 However, even those who hold such a
market-based view would agree that market failures should be
identified and corrected.308
Several scholars attempted to do exactly this. Hugh Collins,
for example, pointed to three main reasons for market failures,
which in turn justify regulation of the employment relationship:
inadequate information, the use of monopoly power in the market,
Guy Davidov suggests that
and high transaction costs.309
inequality of bargaining power exists when market failures enable
305

See Davidov, The Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, supra note 30, at
138–39.
306
Id. at 140 (noting that this concept “suffers from inherent vagueness”).
307
Id. at 139.
308
For a justification of employment law as a social means to correct market failures,
see Alan Hyde, What is Labour Law?, in BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF LABOUR LAW:
GOALS AND MEANS IN THE REGULATION OF WORK 37 (Guy Davidov & Brian Langille
eds., 2006). Hyde argues that
[l]abour and employment law is the collection of regulatory
techniques and values that are properly applied to any market that, if
left unregulated, will reach socially sub-optimal outcomes because
economic actors are individuated and cannot overcome collective
action problems . . . . On this view, labour law is not the set, in
theory infinite, of human values that might rationally be imposed by
societies on markets. Rather, labour law is the much narrower set of
values that correct market failures through particular legal
techniques.
Id. at 53–54.
309
See Collins, supra note 304, at 7–11.
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the employer to influence the terms of the contract more than the
employee can.310
Put differently, various failures of the
employment market are often conceived and rephrased as unequal
bargaining power.
These failures can be grouped into factors internal to the
relationship between the employer and employee and those
external to the particular relationship, which the parties cannot
control but may use or abuse within the relationship. The first
group includes information deficiencies of various kinds, bounded
rationality and lock-in costs.311 The second group includes market
conditions, such as the level of unemployment and whether the
employer enjoys a monopolistic status.312
2. Information Deficiencies
Information deficiencies play a crucial role: without knowledge
about the rule of allocation of the copyright work, one cannot plan
his or her steps and is unlikely to raise the issue of ownership in
negotiations, and in fact, the entire incentives-talk of copyright law
becomes shallow and empty. How many authors are familiar with
copyright law principles, i.e., which works are protected and which
are not? How would an author respond to the work-made-for-hire
doctrine, had she known about it? Perhaps she would prefer to
remain an independent contractor, or, if she is an employee, she
would try to “work around” the doctrine and make the work
outside the scope of employment, or perhaps discuss the issue with
the employer before engaging in the costly making of the work.
Information about the law, about the status of the author as an
employee and about the circumstances of making the work—is
crucial.
Unlike the employee, the employer usually is more
knowledgeable about copyright law, especially an employer in the
content industry.313 There is an asymmetry of information between
the parties.314 Dealing with copyright law might be central to the
310
311
312
313
314

Davidov, The Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, supra note 30, at 139.
See id.
See id.
See Collins, supra note 304, at 7–8.
Id. at 8.
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employer’s business, but even if this is not the case, the employer
typically enjoys ongoing legal services. The employer in the
content business is a repeat player and has better (institutional)
memory than the hired, creative party.315
On the other hand, the employee has better knowledge
regarding his or her ability to perform the expected job and make
the works which he or she was hired to make.316 The employee
usually knows, or at least knows better than the new employer, her
abilities, how she manages her time, works under pressure, and the
like circumstances. The employer also bears related costs, such as
monitoring the employees once hired, and is subject to employees’
strategic behavior.317
However, the dual asymmetries do not negate each other. The
employer has some information about the employee’s abilities,
based on prior works, recommendations, and the employer’s
experience in hiring new employees.318 In as much as ownership is
concerned, the employer is on the stronger side of this asymmetry
of information, and in the typical case, is in a better position to
plan and affect ownership.319 When the employee has experience
in similar dealings, though, he or she is likely to raise the issue of
ownership and place it on the negotiations table, and will not
automatically accept the allocation offered by the employer.320
Bounded rationality, i.e., various factors which cause human
decision making to be imperfect and not fully rational, further
enhance the inferiority of the employee vis-à-vis the employer.321
The employer is better positioned to assess the likelihood of
success of the work in the market and can more easily survey and
315

See Towse, Copyright Policy, supra note 45, at 69–71.
See Collins, supra note 304, at 8 (pointing out, in the general context of
employment, a dual informational asymmetry about the quality of the proposed
employment relationship).
317
See Simon Deakin & Frank Wilkinson, Labour Law and Economic Theory: A
Reappraisal, in LEGAL REGULATION OF EMPLOYMENT RELATION 29, 43 (Hugh Collins,
Paul Davies, Roger Rideout eds., 2000).
318
See Collins, supra note 304, at 7.
319
See Collins, supra note 304, at 7–8. See generally Merges, supra note 65, at 12.
320
See Merges, supra note 65, at 14.
321
See Davidov, The Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, supra note 30, at
139.
316
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study the market to assess whether there is, or is expected to be,
competition.322 The employer also has better access to marketing
channels and more resources to market the work. Employees, on
the other hand (and this is an admitted gross generalization) are
less informed about market conditions and marketing channels but
nevertheless tend to overestimate the potential commercial success
of the work.323 Reality is often harsh. Add to this optimism bias
the instincts of ownership (I made it, it’s mine!), and the
endowment effect is in play.324
The interim conclusion is that the employee is disadvantaged
vis-à-vis the employer.
3. External Factors
External factors lend further power to the employer at the
expense of the employee. A young musician is thrilled to be
offered “a contract” to produce a record; an author is tremendously
excited about a publisher’s offer to publish a book; and an
academic is interested in publication, not necessarily in the money
and ownership of the work, but rather in the fact of publication
itself, else (academic) perishing might be real. While the
musician, author, and academic are often freelancers rather than
employees, the analysis is similar in the case of those authors who
opt for an employment relation rather than remaining independent
contractors. When the employer’s interests are commercial and the
employee’s interests are more personal and less commercial, this
divergence of interests is likely to reflect itself in a reduced interest
in the issue of ownership on the employee’s side.
In some cases, the employment market and the strength of the
particular employer in the market create an ex ante power
advantage to the employer: if 86% of the U.S. music market is in
the hands of the “big four” labels,325 then a junior musician does
322

See Towse, Copyright Policy, supra note 45, at 69.
Id. at 69, 71.
324
See Sunstein, supra note 160, at 112.
325
Patrick Burkart, Loose Integration in the Popular Music Industry, 28 POPULAR
MUSIC & SOC’Y 489 (2005). This figure is dated to 2005, and the “big four” refers to
Universal Music Group (UMG), Sony-Bertelsmann Music Group (Sony-BMG), Electric
and Musical Industries (EMI), and Warner Music Group (WMG). See id.
323
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not have much choice.326 Going “indie” (independent) is a costly,
risky avenue.327 While superstars are not powerless and perhaps
even more powerful than the industry player, they are, by
definition, very few. The vast majority of authors seem, at first
sight, to be trapped in an unpleasant situation.
4. Trading Risks
An intermediate conclusion would be rather dim: authors are
powerless, and alternative routes are few. However, we should
take into account not only the point of view of the author, but
rather zoom-out and examine the deal between the employeeauthor and the employer as a whole. Presenting the deal as a ripoff ignores the transfer of risks between the parties.
The discussion here merges with the previous discussion of
risks in the workplace, conducted under a copyright prism.328 In
most cases, the employment relationship reflects a trade-off of
risks and benefits between the parties.329 The employee is hired to
create works. She provides her time and work power in exchange
for security.330 The risk-averse author who lacks the knowledge,
funds, or will to run her own business would turn to the salaried
employment option.331 Her option to do so is dependent, of course,
on the availability of an employer who is willing to hire employees
rather than to commission an independent contractor, assuming
that the market of employees is competitive and that the employee

326
Id. (discussing the market share of the majors and arguing that the music industry
operates as a rent-seeking cartel and noting that the independent music industry accounts
for only 14% of U.S. music sales and the “big four” controls the rest of the market
(86%)).
327
Technology enables young artists direct publication avenues, such as by uploading
their music to P2P sharing programs, a personal website, or a social network.
328
See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
329
See Ann-Sophie Vandenberghe, Labour Contracts, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 541, 550 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) (“At the heart
of the principal-agent problem lies the inevitable trade-off between the provision of
incentives to work hard and the sharing of risks.”).
330
Davidov, The Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, supra note 30, at 143
n.34.
331
See Vandenberghe, supra note 329, at 548.
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has several potential employers to choose from.332 The author
would receive a stable salary and other benefits such as pension
and paid vacations; he or she also would not be subject to various
risks associated with making the work and commercializing it or
risks such as liability for torts (assuming that the vicarious liability
doctrine applies).333 The author would also not need to engage in
managing the business, searching for clients, dealing with
regulators, etc.
These benefits do not come without a price. The author loses
ownership.334 She needs to follow the instructions of her employer
and is limited in her artistic and creative freedom, at least in the
workplace.335
The alternative is undertaking the costs of
expression and the risk herself. When these risks are too high, the
alternative is not engaging in any creative work at all.
***
Viewing the employment relationship in the content business
as a trade of risks is attractive, as it coincides with the copyright
analysis. However, the information deficiencies and external
factors are not obliterated just because there is a deal and a contract
between the parties. We need to search for responses to the
difficulties discussed here.
C. Responding to Inequality
The legal solutions we need to search for should fit as much as
possible both our conception of copyright law under the incentives
theory and our conception of employment law as fairness.
Operating within a general free-market paradigm and having
pointed to some of the market’s deficiencies, we need to address
them. This sub-section points to two possible non-exclusive
332

Davidov, The Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, supra note 30, at 138–

40.
333

Id.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); see also Fisk, Authors at Work, supra note 42, at 56–59
(discussing the difficulty of reconciling corporate ownership and individual artistic
expression).
335
This is similar to the situation of the independent contractor who needs to follow the
instructions of the commissioner of her work, but has the choice not to take the job in the
first place.
334
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mechanisms. First, informed consent narrows the claim of
unfairness regarding ownership of copyrighted works made in the
workplace. Explicit contracts and job descriptions are tools to
address such deficiencies, accompanied with appropriate
interpretative instructions. These mechanisms solve the problem
that penalty default rules wish to address, without changing the
initial allocation. Second, mechanisms of group negotiations
might ease our instincts of unfairness.
1. Informed Consent
Information about the commercial-legal options and ownership
of copyright can reduce much of the initial observation of
unfairness. If an author understands her options, roughly being (1)
establishing her own business, undertaking the risks, and
maintaining ownership; (2) providing a work as an independent
contractor, without transferring the rights but allowing for a license
to use the work in agreed-upon circumstances, and thus shifting
only some of the risks; or (3) shifting the entire risk to the hiring
party, in exchange for a risk-free salary and giving up ownership,
then she can better decide which avenue to choose. With more
information, surprises might be minimized and the author might be
able to leverage the elements she gives up or retains (risk,
ownership, management hassle) to receive better terms (payment,
internal incentives like a bonus, control over uses of the work).
How can informed consent be achieved? One kind of
information-enhancing tools lies in the market itself. The factors
mentioned in Part II—the work at stake, the kind of employer, and
the kind of employee336—are useful here too. These factors create
a matrix of options.337 The more creative the work is (a
photograph, painting, musical work), the more we can classify the
employer as being in the content/cultural industry, and the more
the author conceives of herself as a creative author, the more the
situation creates awareness of all parties. The circumstances of the
employment themselves convey a clear message to all parties
336

See supra discussion Part II.
In each parameter it is better to think of a spectrum of options rather than a binary
form, hence I resist the temptation to add a table which offers only binary options.
337

C02_BIRNHACK_ARTICLE_123009_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2009]

WHO OWNS BRATZ?

12/30/2009 10:47:12 AM

157

involved, that the creative author was hired to make creative works
which will be sold or used by the employer. Hence, ownership lies
with the employer. Thus, when a doll producer firm offers a
designer a job as a doll designer, the issue of ownership is not, or
rather should not, be a surprise. This is the “Bryant” case.338
The digitization of many kinds of works that began in the
1990s teaches us, authors included, that old works do have a
potential for new commercial uses. For example, a song written
for one purpose can later serve as a ring-tone on a cellular phone or
for a television advertisement. None of this is a secret. This is the
Tasini case.339
On the other hand, when an employee who does not perceive
himself as a creative author works in a non-creative industry,
performs a routine task, and then creates a work of authorship
there, e.g., a computer program worthy of commercialization, then
we could say that the circumstance does not provide clear
indications as to ownership.340 This is the “Miller” case.341
In other words, the circumstances of employment themselves
serve as a rather strong signal about the importance of ownership.
The latter discussion indicates that the temporal dimension is
crucial here. Information that is gained after the employment
contract was struck is not of much use. Hence, the focus should be
on ex ante consent, and more specifically, informed consent.
There are further mechanisms to inform the parties of their
rights. A written contract is an obvious mechanism to clarify the
two sides of the deal, now shaped as an ongoing employment
relationship. However, contracts are often incomprehensible or
indeterminate and require ex post interpretation. Moreover,
employment contracts are dynamic and change in the course of
employment.342 Changes in the patterns of employment do occur
in the course of employment, even if they do not find an explicit
338
339
340
341
342

552.

See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 140–43 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 266–79 and accompanying text.
See Miller v. CP Chems., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1238, 1239 (D.S.C. 1992).
See Mundlak, supra note 258, at 313; see also Vandenberghe, supra note 329, at
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anchoring in a written document.343 A written contract in longterm employments is inherently incomplete, because it does not
address every single possible event that might occur during the
relationship.344 Repeat actions which are not objected to by the
other party become part of the contract.345
Thus, initial
information and consent might change; they might be blurred or
diluted and no longer serve the informing function.
The employer, knowing that current doctrine operates in his or
her favor (if, under agency law, the author is an employee and the
work was made within the scope of the employment relationship),
might not be meticulous in authoring the contract, perhaps
deliberately so. Thus, the informing function of the contract is
likely to be lost.
One possible solution would be a penalty default rule, but for
reasons discussed above, it is likely to be counter-productive.346
The dynamic nature of employment contracts is yet another reason
why penalty default rules are ineffective in their intended purpose
of informing the weaker party of the stakes. Setting an initial
allocation rule is a singular event, whereas the circumstances of the
employment might change this allocation later on, without a
ceremonial event. Accordingly a statutory allocation to either side
is likely to become irrelevant shortly after employment
commences. A second solution to the information deficiencies
would be for courts to adopt an interpretive rule, under which
vague terms and other interpretive doubts operate in favor of the
employee. Such an interpretive rule would provide an incentive to
the employers to be more precise in the contracts they author.
Another carrier of information is the job description, which is
relevant in deciding the second (“scope”) element of the workmade-for-hire doctrine.347 Instead of turning to the rather vague
triple test borrowed from agency law,348 a job description may
provide a clearer point of reference: if the work made by the
343
344
345
346
347
348

See Mundlak, supra note 258, at 313.
See Vandenberghe, supra note 329, at 552.
Id.
See supra Part II.B.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
See supra text accompanying notes 96–97.
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employee falls within the listed tasks, then it is safe to determine
that it was made within the scope of employment, and if it does not
fall within the description, then the author remains the owner. Job
descriptions are not obligatory, but where they do exist, they have
been used as important interpretive sources about the parties’
expectations and actual behavior, including in the context of the
current discussion.349
Employers are likely to attempt broad and vague definitions of
the job descriptions, so they can later claim that a certain task, or a
certain work, were within the scope of employment. Hence, given
the dynamic nature of the employment relationship, once again, the
interpretive mode adopted by the courts is crucial. An interpretive
rule operating in favor of the employee will serve as an ex post
incentive to the employers, to be more precise in the next case, ex
ante. Thus, the job description should be interpreted narrowly.
However, informed consent is no magic cure to all problems,
as authors might misunderstand and subsequently misjudge their
options; understanding the options might be costly, as legal advice
might be needed and other factors, such as cognitive biases, might
divert their judgment. The market and the law can respond with
various background structures to minimize the biases. One such
example is group negotiations.
2. Group Negotiations
Singling out a specific employment relationship and observing
inequality of power between the parties might miss the larger
picture. A possible way to figure out this complex field is framing
the relationship in terms borrowed from game theory, as a repeat
game or a one-shot game between the parties, followed by some
349

One court noted that “Courts deciding whether an employee’s project was the ‘kind
of work’ the employee was hired to perform rely heavily on the employee’s job
description.” City of Newark v. Beasley, 883 F. Supp. 3, 8 (D.N.J. 1995). Other cases
have referred to job descriptions, though they do not seem to have followed the
interpretive approach advocated here. See Avtec Sys. Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 569
(4th Cir. 1994); Gilpin v. Sieber, 419 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1297–98 (D. Or. 2006); Genzmer
v. Pub. Health Trust of Miami-Dade County, 219 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1276 (S.D. Fla.
2002); Miller v. CP Chems., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1238, 1244 (D.S.C. 1992) (citing
Marshall v. Miles Labs., 647 F. Supp. 1326, 1330 (N.D. Ind. 1986)).
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distinctions. Instead of focusing on one employment context with
one employer and one employee, we should ask whether there is a
larger market-picture. If authors can act together, they might be
able to overcome the weakness of each of them when they act on
their own. Common action of authors-employees can shift a oneshot game into a more efficient repeat game. The Hollywood
screenwriters’ strike in late 2007 provides an example of a
successful common action.350 The screenwriters could have
chosen the legal avenue and relied on Tasini, but given Tasini’s
aftermath, it seems that the screenwriters achieved more by
striking.
In a one-shot game, the parties are focused on the gains and
losses from that specific interaction and each party attempts to
maximize its gains. If one party in a one-shot game is stronger
than the other, absent a legal rule to the contrary, the stronger party
is likely to take advantage of its power at the expense of the other
party. This is often the situation of independent contractors. To
prevent this, all legal models assist the weaker side in various
ways. The U.S. model, for example, leaves the copyright with the
independent contractor, unless several conditions are met.351
These conditions delineate when a relationship is a work-made-forhire; only specific kinds of commissioned works qualify, and, most
importantly in my view, the parties must formalize their
relationship and explicitly specify that the work is to be considered
a work-made-for-hire.352 These requirements, once fulfilled,
contain a clear signal to the parties about the kind of transaction
into which they are entering, including the issue of copyright
ownership. The required formalities inform both parties, and each
side can now assess its situation and decide whether to enter the
transaction or not.
Unlike independent contractors, the employee and the
employer are engaged in a repeat game. In a content industry
context, the employer is interested in the employee creating more
350

See Press Release, Writers’ Guild of America, Writers Guild Members
Overwhelmingly Ratify New Contract (Feb. 26, 2008), http://www.wga.org/subpage_
newsevents.aspx?id=2780.
351
See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a), (b) (2006).
352
Id. §§ 101, 201.
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works of quality and the employee knows that. The employer who
is interested in a steady stream of works realizes that it will be
counter-productive to treat the employee in an unfair manner, all
other factors being equal.353 In the normal course of the
employment relationship and under the assumptions of no other
market failures, these considerations mean that the salary will be
reasonable and/or that the employer will search for ways to create
incentives for the employees where there are unexpected,
unforeseen gains.354 Internal incentives can take the form of
bonuses or a more direct sharing of the revenues, such as an
escalating scheme: After covering the expenses, the more revenue
the work produces, the higher will be the employee’s share.355
The result of the dynamics described here can be achieved by
forming a union. Once the employees act together, they are no
longer in a continuous one-shot game subject to the arbitrary will
of the employer, but rather, they are part of a multiple repeat game
between two parties whose respective power is now on par, or at
least not as unequal as before unionizing.
The assumptions underlying this analysis should be underlined,
so we know the limits thereof and can address other situations
accordingly. The above applies to the content industry, where
employees are hired to make creative works. A content industry,
by definition, engages in the continuous production of creative
works, hence the game is a repeat one. Both parties are aware (or
should be) of the trade-off of risks. The consideration takes place
ex ante, when the author still has the choice of working as an
individual, independent contractor, or as an employee. The author
therefore engages in the transaction at free will and has been
informed, and thus the requirement of informed consent is satisfied
353
One factor that might disturb this scenario is the market power of the employer. If
the employer has a monopolistic power in the field and the employee’s skills are not
easily applicable in other industries, then the employer is likely to be able to extract more
from the employees.
354
Vandenberghe, supra note 329, at 550.
355
The sharing of gains should not be at the expense of the steady salary, otherwise the
risk component of the salary increases and the employer is likely to reduce the base
salary. See LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 145, at 272. A
salary based solely on a pay for performance principle runs into many difficulties. See
Vandenberghe, supra note 329, at 550.
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and asymmetries of information are narrowed. When these
assumptions do not apply, such as in a non-content industry where
an employee unexpectedly makes a work of authorship, the
ownership was not discussed and was not traded-off, it would not
make sense to talk about a repeat game.
CONCLUSION
This article searched for the most efficient and fair rule of
initial allocation of copyright in works created by authors in the
workplace. Applying a dual perspective of both copyright law and
employment law results in several lessons. First, we should
recognize typical cases, in which we can identify the risk-bearer (a
lesson from copyright law). Possible criteria for devising such
typical cases are the kind of work, the kind of employee, and the
business of the employer. These criteria serve as proxies for the
allocation of risks and fairness and are helpful under both the
copyright and the employment law analysis, thus providing
convenient common grounds to integrate the two bodies of law and
diffuse the tension between efficiency and fairness. Second, the
law should allocate the rights to the best risk-bearer (a lesson from
copyright law), while searching for potential instances of unequal
bargaining power such as information deficiencies and addressing
them (a lesson from employment law). Third, the law should
avoid allocations which the market is likely to instantly correct in a
costless manner (a lesson from the Coasean analysis and Tasini’s
aftermath). Fourth, from an employment law perspective, this
article suggested that we should search for mechanisms that correct
information deficiencies. These led us to distinguish between
different factual situations, which fit the typical cases proposed
under the copyright law analysis. Furthermore, this article
suggested the enhanced use of written job descriptions,
accompanied by pro-author interpretive rules. Fifth, we realized
that penalty default rules would not be an efficient tool to
overcome information deficiencies in the employment context, due
to the nature of the employment relationship and their subsequent
demoralization costs.
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Thus, this article largely supports the current legal model, with
some proposed modifications regarding the interpretation of the
work-made-for-hire doctrine. However, it is based on a joint
copyright-employment analysis, rather than an agency/tort shaky
basis.
The result of this analysis seems to be counterintuitive, or at
least contrary to some intuitions. At first sight, it might seem that
creative employees (the “Bryants”) are less protected under the
above analysis than those who happen to make a creative work by
chance (The “Millers”). However, the analysis showed that the
trade-off risks and the informed consent satisfactorily responds to
the unfairness instincts.

